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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
This research effort is directed at analyzing the issues
surrounding the allowability of lobbying costs in Federal
grants and contracts. Three primary regulations are examined:
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR 31.205-22) for Defense
Department procurement; The Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-122 (OMB A-122) for non-profit grantees; and The
Uniform Lobbying Cost Principles Act of 1984 (S.2251) sponsored
by Senator David Durenberger.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: What effect will the
proposed changes to Federal regulations concerning the allow-
ability of lobbying costs have on the relationship between
private industry and the Federal Government? Secondary ques-
tions addressed are:
1. What is the definition and applicability of lobbying
costs according to law and regulation?
2. What are the political implications and ramifications
of proposed and current regulations?
3. What is the position of private industry on the re-
gulations?
4. What is the position of the Department of Defense
on the regulations?
5. What effect will the regulations have on Department
of Defense buying organizations and private industry?
6. What effect will the regulations have on Congression-
al procedures?
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The scope of this thesis is limited to an analysis of
The Department of Defense's (DOD) attempt to regulate lobby-
ing costs since 1977. Due to the close relationship of DOD '
s
endeavors and those of The Office of Management And Budget
(0MB) in revising Circular A-122, an analysis of OMB ' s pro-
posal was also conducted. This study did not attempt to com-
pare these regulatory proposals with any others for form,
content or applicability. Personal interviews were limited
to selected Congressional staff members, selected DOD acqui-
sition policy personnel, selected OMB personnel involved in
the regulations, and selected defense contractor representatives.
D. METHODOLOGY
Initially, a literature search was conducted utilizing
current periodicals. Congressional Hearings, Government pub-
lications, and Government and industry correspondence con-
cerning the allowability of lobbying costs in Federal procurement
Correspondence was then conducted with Congressional staff per-
sonnel, Department of Defense procurement managers. Office of
Management and Budget personnel concerned with Circular A-122,
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and private industry organizations and lobbyists. Finally,
personal interviews were conducted with key officials of the
aforementioned organizations to clarify the primary issues
uncovered in the preliminary research.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
In addition to the Introduction, which provides the reader
with a general description of the research effort, this thesis




This segment analyzes the various definitions of lobby-
ing utilized in Federal regulations and the inherent problems
associated with defining lobbying. In addition, it details the
history of regulating lobbying activity in Government grants and
contracts by executive agencies and Congressional actions. It
concludes with a description of the current and proposed pro-
curement regulations on lobbying.
2 Theory
This segment examines the accounting concept behind cost
allowability in Government contracts and the applicability of
the lobbying regulations on the various types of contracts. It
presents the purpose of the regulations and what the executive
agencies are attempting to accomplish with their position on
lobbying. The question of regulation versus legislation is dis-
cussed to set the tone for the political ramifications stirred
by the lobbying issue.
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3.
Issues^ Data Presentation, and Analysis
In this third segment, the primary issues and concerns
of the regulations and the rationale presented for positions
taken by the interested parties are examined. An analysis of
these issues is presented detailing the logic and support for
the positions taken. Although this analysis will be primarily
based on research data, the researcher's observations will also




The researcher's conclusions and recommendations are
presented in this final segment. Conclusions drawn are the re-
sult of the information and data presented, and the recommenda-
tions are the author's opinions regarding the best feasible
solution to the problems presented.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. REGULATION OF LOBBYING
The potential abuse of utilizing Federal funding for lobby-
ing purposes considered not in the best interest of the public
has been a recognized problem for a number of years. The attempt
by the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) through the pro-
posed change to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
31.205-22 (Appendix B) of April 1984 are the latest attempts
by the Executive Department to solve this problem. The Uniform
Lobbying Cost Principles Act of 1984
,
(S.2251) (Appendix C)
is the most recent Congressional approach to the allowability
of lobbying costs in Federal Government grants and contracts.
The results of the attempts to regulate the allowability
of lobbying costs have met with limited success and with very
little consensus as to the proper action to take on this issue.
As seen in Appendix D, a chronology of Executive Branch and
Congressional action on lobbying, the attempts by both Exec-
utive and Congressional leaders to regulate lobbying have been
evolving since 1977 with numerous changes in intent and direc-
tion. A primary issue has been the definition of lobbying
and the associated costs. Appendix E lists the various defi-
nitions that are applicable and have been utilized in the nu-
merous attempts to regulate lobbying costs charged to Government
grants and contracts. The various definitions and their differing
13
scopes depict the problem the Government has experienced in
reaching a consensus regarding the nature of lobbying.
B. HISTORY OF LOBBYING REGULATIONS
1 . The Period Prior to Formal Department of Defense
Regulations-- 1977- 1980
The first attempt by DOD to regulate the allowability
of lobbying costs was brought about by Congressional action
and the results of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
audits in 1977. Interest by Senator William Proxmire in the
regulation of lobbying was instrumental in the first DOD reg-
ulation. In a letter to then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,
Senator Proxmire questioned the use of acquisition funding
to pay for contractor lobbying since DOD spent time and money
on liaison with Congress on specific budget requests [1:2].
In addition, results of DCAA audits of ten major defense con-
tractors for the period of 1974-1975 questioned expenditures
of over eleven million dollars for five of the contractors'
Washington offices [2:1]. With the lobbying issue in full
public view, DOD proposed a change to the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations (ASPR) (Appendix F) in December of 1977.
This proposal defined lobbying only as attempts to influence
the Congress and stated that both direct and indirect costs
associated with this activity were unallowable.
The reaction by industry to the proposal began a pat-
tern that would continue throughout future efforts to regulate
14
lobbying costs. The primary objections centered around the
authority of an executive agency to regulate lobbying costs
and the necessity for supplying information to Congress to
aid the legislative process [3:1]. Finding it difficult to
define lobbying, the proposal was subsequently dropped by DOD
with no action taken by Congress or the other executive agencies
In 1979, DOD again tried to regulate lobbying costs
with a November 26, 1979 proposed change to DAR (Appendix G)
.
This proposal was very similar to the 1977 proposal and was
concerned primarily with attempts to influence the Congress.
Unlike the 1977 proposal, DOD sought the concurrence of the
other executive agencies and the acceptance by the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) . While OFPP found DOD '
s
cost principle acceptable [4], another pattern was set when
the General Services Administration (GSA) and the other civil-
ian agencies, felt the DOD initiative was not strict enough
in the areas of state, local, and foreign lobbying costs [5].
Failing to get any consensus on the lobbying cost principle,
DOD withdrew the proposal. The reasoning supplied was that
the cost principles could result in higher contract adminis-
tration costs with little appreciable increase in cost dis-
allowances, and that contractors either voluntarily eliminated
or agreed to the disallowance of lobbying costs that were to
be regulated [6].
After the withdrawal of the second DOD proposal. Sena-
tor Proxmire turned to OFPP to propose a comprehensive cost
15
principle dealing with lobbying for the entire Federal Govern-
ment [7:2] . OFPP sided with DOD concluding the current regu-
lations and audit guidelines were adequate and that Congress
might desire to formulate legislation to address the lobbying
issue [8]. Although no action was taken by the Congress or
other executive agencies, the impetus for action was still
present in various articles and political speeches which final-
ly lead to the first lobbying cost standard.
2 . Changes to the Defense Acquisition Regulations--
1981-1982
In October of 1981, DOD, under the direction of Secre-
tary of Defense Casper Weinberger, added a new cost principle,
DAR 15.205.51, to regulate lobbying costs (Appendix H) . In
doing this, the tone of the Reagan Administration's reaction
to lobbying was set with Secretary of Defense Weinberger stating,
"I feel strongly that Government contractors should not be
permitted to charge to defense contracts the costs of lobby-
ing the Congress in an attempt to get additional defense con-
tracts" [9:A-1]. The primary difference between this cost
principle and the ones that would follow, centered around the
concept of legislation liaison. In this initial regulation,
these costs were allowable.
At the same time DOD was formulating its cost princi-
ple, it appeared that Congress might also take some action.
Senator David Pryor introduced a bill (S.1969) to prohibit
the Government from paying for lobbying costs for defense
16
contractors [10]. The bill never got out of committee, and
DOD remained the sole regulator of lobbying costs.
In November of 1982, the DAR was changed again at the
direction of Secretary Weinberger, to prohibit contractors
from being reimbursed for all lobbying costs, including legis-
lative liaison costs [11]. This stricter cost principle, de-
tailed in Appendix I, was part of the effort to alleviate
fraud, waste, and mismanagement in Defense contracting [12].
Also in November, GSA issued a regulation prohibiting contrac-
tors from charging the costs of their lobbying activities to
the price of their contracts with Federal civilian agencies
[13]. This regulation--detailed in Appendix J--differed from
the Defense Regulation in the critical area of legislative
liaison. The GSA regulation did not make all legislative liai-
son activities unallowable. For the period from November 1982
until the current change to the FAR, the treatment of lobbying
costs was different for the various Government agencies.
3 . The Office of Management and Budget Proposed Change
to Circular A-122 and the Other Executive Agency
Proposals— 198 3-1984
Although DOD and the civilian procurement agencies
had cost principles on lobbying, there was no regulation on
non-profit organizations, and there was no uniformity in the
agency regulations. On January 20, 1983, this changed when
0MB issued a proposed change to Circular A-122 (Appendix K)
,
and the other agencies issued similar proposals to their
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respective regulations. These proposals drew immediate cri-
ticism from all concerned, including DOD and GSA, who indi-
cated the proposal was entirely the initiative of 0MB.
Congressional Hearings were held on March 1, 1983 by
the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, chaired
by Congressman Jack Brooks. The reason for the hearings was
concern with the receipt of Federal funds depending on a wai-
ver of First Amendment rights by the contractors and grantees
[14:2]. Although the hearings were held primarily on the pro-
posed Circular A-122, the other agency regulations were exa-
mined due to their duplication of purpose. The results of
the Congressional Hearings brought forth the following list
of the most objectionable unallowable items in the regulations:
1. communications with any Government official or employee
who may participate in the decision-making process
2. direct or indirect funding of political action com-
mittees
3- The entire salary of individuals who participate in
any form of political advocacy
4
.
any building or office space where more than five per-
cent of the usable space is devoted to activities consti-
tuting political advocacy
5. any equipment or other items used in part for politi-
cal advocacy
6. meetings and conferences devoted in any part to poli-
tical advocacy
18
7. membership in an organization that has political ad-
vocacy as a substantial organization purpose, or that
spends one hundred thousand dollars or more per year in
connection with political advocacy [15]
Due to the opposition to the proposals, led by Congressman
Brooks, all the proposals were withdrawn.
Although Congress and much of the private sector con-
cerned with defense contracts were opposed to DOD ' s position
on lobbying. Secretary Weinberger did not amend the DAR con-
cerning lobbying costs. His views on disallowing lobbying
costs were reiterated in his answer to a request to withdraw
the regulation.
Over the past few years there has been considerable con-
cern expressed by both the Congress and the Administration
that it was unreasonable to include the costs of contrac-
tor lobbying activities in the cost used to determine re-
imbursements to contractors furnishing services and products
to DOD. Those expressions of concern have neither changed
nor diminished. Accordingly, I plan to retain the DAR Cost
Principle that pertains to lobbying [16].
In November 198 3, 0MB and the other executive procurement
agencies issued new cost principle proposals (Appendix L, M,
N) . Unlike the January proposals, there was not total uni-
formity between the organizations, A new controversy was
raised between DOD coverage and that of 0MB. The DOD propo-
sal made legislative liaison activities and lobbying at the
state and local levels unallowable costs. This disparity in
the regulatory approach was severely criticized. The major
changes to 0MB ' s proposal answered many of the most vocal
19
critics in the following manner:
1. the expansive term "political advocacy" was changed to
"lobbying and related activities" for clarity [17:731]
2. the concept of standard cost allocation for unallowable
activities was utilized to replace the initial concept of
total disallowance of an activity involved with lobbying
[18:2]
3. The proposal did not cover:
a. "lobbying at the local level (covered under the cur-
rent DAR)
b. "appearances before Congress or state legislatures
at their written request (covered under the current DAR]
c. "contracts with Executive Branch officials, other
than in connection with the veto or signing of enrolled
bills, or attempts to use state or local officials as
conduits for unallowable activity
d. "litigation on behalf of others not directly author-
ized by grant or contract
e. "lobbying at the state level that would affect the
organization's ability or cost of performing a grant
or contract (covered under DAR)
f. "the entire cost of membership dues to trade asso-
ciations or other organizations which have lobbying as
a substantial organizational purpose" [17:731]
Although these changes corrected many complaints, two
areas were still viewed as being highly unacceptable: the
20
provision requiring contractors and grantees to certify that
they have complied with the lobbying cost principles and the
"twenty-five percent rule" concerning record keeping [17:705],
The "twenty-five percent rule" requires contractors and grant-
ee employees to maintain auditable records of lobbying activi-
ties when they spend more than twenty-five percent of their
time in lobbying activities. After holding hearings on the
new proposal, Congressman Brooks was still not satisfied and
demanded additional changes to the regulations [19].
After months of negotiating between DOD , 0MB, GAO,
and Congressional staffs, new proposals were issued on April
27, 1984 [23:749]. The most significant changes in the pro-
posal were:
1. "Related activities" was deleted from the definition
of lobbying
2. legislative liaison is now only unallowable "when such
activities are carried on in support of or in knowing pre-
paration for an effort to engage in unallowable lobbying
3. "technical assistance to Congress can be provided on
either oral or written request, by staff members or Con-
gressmen, and if a notice is in the Congressional Record
4. "the way to determine whether the 'twenty-five percent
rule' applied
5. "the manner of 'how lobbying costs are to be identified
in indirect cost rate proposals'" [23:749]
In addition, the language of the FAR and 0MB proposals were
21
almost identical with no major difference on unallowable and
not disallowable activities.
While the executive agencies were attempting to pro-
duce an acceptable cost principle on lobbying. Congress was
also focusing on the lobbying issue. In many appropriation
bills, including Defense, a rider was attached, directly
affecting the issue of lobbying. In stating that "none of
the funds made available by this Act shall be used in any way,
directly or indirectly to influence congressional action or
any legislation or appropriation matters pending before Con-
gress" [21], Congress made it evident that it was opposed to
Government reimbursement of lobbying expenses. However, the
question of what constitutes lobbying was still not answered.
The introduction of Senator Durenberger ' s bill to correlate
the definition of lobbying with the Internal Revenue Service
Code is the current Congressional attempt to resolve this
issue
.
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT PROPOSALS
The present focus on the allowability of lobbying costs
centers on three regulatory proposals: 0MB Circular A-122;
FAR 31.205-22; and S.2251. All are currently under review
to attempt to define the lobbying policy.
1 . Circular A-122
The following primary activities are considered not
allowable:
22
A. "Federal, state, or local electioneering and support
of such entities as campaign organizations, and political
action committees
B. "Most direct lobbying of Congress and... state legis-
latures, to influence legislation
C. "Lobbying of the Executive Branch in connection with
decisions to sign or veto enrolled legislation
D. "Grassroots lobbying concerning either Federal or
State legislation
E. "Legislative liaison activities in support of unallow-
able lobbying activities" [64:18261]
The following items are not disallowed:
A. "lobbying at the local level
B. "lobbying to influence state legislation, in order to
directly reduce the cost of performing the grant or con-
tract, or to avoid impairing the organization's authority
to do so
C. "Lobbying in the form of a technical and factual pre-
sentation to Congress or state legislatures at their request
D. "Contracts with Executive Branch Officials other than
lobbying for the veto or signing of enrolled bills" [64:18261]
It should be noted that because an item is considered not un-
allowable does not automatically make it allowable. The spe-
cific terms of the grant, contract or other agreements are
the determining factors as to allowability of these items [17:733]
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2. FAR 31.205-22
This proposal incorporates all the unallowable acti-
vities and not disallowed activities in Circular A-122.
3. Senate Bill S.2251
The effort of Senator Durenberger to legislate the
allowability of lobbying costs limits the unallowable acti-
vities to attempts to influence legislation. Unallowable
activities would be attempts at trying to affect the opinions
of the general public, and communication with legislative or
other Government officials who are formulating legislation.
Items considered not unallowable are:
A. providing technical advice or assistance to Congress
B. contracts with Executive Branch Officials
C. local and state lobbying
D. Political Action Committees
There is also a unique requirement which requires contractors
and grantees to notify a member of Congress when the techni-
cal assistance being provided will result in more than one
hundred dollars being charged to the grant or contract [24:2].
As is evident from the history of the various propo-
sals to regulate lobbying costs, it has taken the executive
agencies a long time to present a uniform cost principle. The
latest proposal is a compromise which is believed by 0MB to
have achieved the best consensus possible [64:750]. This does
not necessarily make it the best possible cost principle and
24
many issues on how it should be structured still remain. These
will be examined in the following chapters to attempt to ascer-
tain the validity of the final proposal.
D. SUMMARY
The attempts by DOD , 0MB, and the Congress to regulate
lobbying costs have been marked by varied opinions and actions
on what to regulate. Starting with the initial DOD proposals
restricted to regulating attempts to influence Congress, the
various proposals have branched out to encompass legislative
liaison activities, political advocacy, and state and local
lobbying. The latest proposals by the executive agencies
appear to have centered on regulating attempts to influence
legislation at various governmental levels.
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III. FRAMEWORK AND THEORY
A. ACCOUNTING CONCEPT OF COST ALLOWABILITY
The primary reference in the determination of the allow-
ability of a particular item in Federal Government grants and
contracts is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) . Five
factors listed in section 31.201-2 (a) of the FAR for deter-
mination of cost allowability are:
1. Reasonableness
2. Allocability
3. Standards promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards
(CAS) Board, if applicable, otherwise, generally accepted




Terms of the contract
5. Any limitiations set forth in this subpart [25:31-7,
31-8]
.
To determine reasonableness. Section 31.201-3 of the FAR
gives necessary guidance. A reasonable cost is one which does
not exceed what a prudent person would accrue in the conduct
of business in its nature or amount [25:31-8]. To implement
this definition, four considerations are employed.
1. "whether it is the type of cost generally recognized
as ordinary and necessary for the conduct of the contrac-
tor's business or the contract performance
2. "the restraints or requirements imposed by such fac-
tors as generally accepted sound business practices, arm's-
length bargaining. Federal and State laws and regulations,
and contract terms and specifications
26
3. "the action that a prudent business person, consider-
ing responsibilities to the owners of the business, employ-
ees, customers, the Government, and the public at large,
would take under the circumstances
4. "any significant deviations from the established prac-
tices of the contractor that may unjustifiably increase the
contract costs" [25:31-8].
In addition to reasonableness, the concept of allocability
must be examined to determine cost allowability. The FAR de-
fines an allocable cost as one that is "assignable or charge-
able to one or more cost objectives on the basis of relative
benefits received or other equitable relationship" [25:31-8].
Section 31.201-4 of the FAR further delineates direct, indi-
rect, and overhead costs that are allocable to Government
grants and contracts. Costs are allocable if:
1. "incurred specifically for the contract
2. "benefit both the contract and other work, and can be
distributed to them in reasonable proportion to the bene-
fits received
3. "necessary to the overall operation of the business,
although a direct relationship to any particular cost ob-
jective cannot be shown" [25:31-8].
When a cost has been determined to be unallowable, direct-
ly associated costs are also considered unallowable [25:31-8].
In addition, records are required to be maintained which are
27
"adequate to establish and maintain visibility of identified
unallowable costs, including directly associated costs"
[25:31-8]
.
The costs of lobbying under the current proposals appear
to be in accordance with the above listed guidelines. In-
direct as well as direct costs are covered under the proposals
and only the portion of a cost item that is actually used in
lobbying activities is considered unallowable [17:732]. Al-
though the extent of record keeping required to justify the
allowability of lobbying costs is not specifically defined
in the proposals [18:8], indirect cost employees who certify
they spend less than twenty-five percent of their time on
lobbying or related activities are not required to maintain
any documentation for audit purposes [22:6]. This exemption
would not apply to organizations that have materially mis-
stated allowable or unallowable costs in the past five years
[17: 733] .
The interpretation of the guidance on cost allowability
and its application to the lobbying cost proposals is not with-
out critics. The Department of Defense Inspector General be-
lieves a major weakness of the proposals is their lack of
clarity concerning the allowability of activities of indirect
cost employees where less than twenty-five percent of their
normal time is spent on lobbying [26:1]. He is concerned that
"any judgemental estimate by the contractor would be very
28
subjective and would establish a poor precedent for future
cost principles on accounting for both allowable and unallow-
able costs" [26:2]. Mr. Bowsher of the General Accounting
Office (GAO) is further critical of the regulations and is
of the opinion that there should be a better way to handle
the lobbying cost allowability issue. He believes that the
answer is for the executive agencies to achieve better con-
sistency in what is considered an allowable cost and what is
an unallowable cost [15:66]. Secretary Weinberger, however,
believes that more regulation is necessary. His opinion that
"there are far too many items allowed for reimbursement any-
way, and I think it does nothing but undermine public support
for what we are trying to do" [27] was one of the primary mo-
tivating factors behind the earlier restrictive DOD proposal.
This lack of any clear consensus within the various Govern-
ment branches on how the subject of cost allowability should
be handled, greatly exacerbated the formulation of lobbying
cost regulations.
B. APPLICABILITY TO VARIOUS CONTRACT TYPES
The extent of regulation of lobbying costs is dependent
on the type of contract a contractor enters into with the
Government. The type of contract determines the audit con-
siderations and examination of costs that the Government will
conduct. Lobbying cost. allowance or disallowance would only
apply to negotiated procurements of both fixed price or cost
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reimbursement contracts [28]. Due to this, critics of the
proposal have voiced objections to the discriminatory nature
of the proposals. The objection centers around the issue that
a company would have to maintain separate accounting systems
depending on the type of contract for which it is competing.
A company doing identical work in the private sector, utili-
zing a fixed price non-negotiated Government contract, and
utilizing a cost plus fee Government contract would have to
maintain three separate accounting systems [15:183]. Since
there are other unallowable costs that must be similarily
handled by contractors, this objection does not appear to
have significant substance in the issue of lobbying costs.
C. PURPOSE OF THE REGULATIONS
The purpose behind the executive agencies' actions are
seen by many of the involved groups to represent more than
the idea of determining the allowability of a specific cost.
In these viewpoints, the political implications, which will
be discussed in subsequent chapters, appear to play a promi-
nent role. David Horowitz of 0MB was quoted as stating,
...this is really a test of whether the broad public
interest can duke it out, toe to toe, with a broad
collection of special interests. As I see it, that
is what this Administration was elected to do--to
clean up that comfortable arrangement between public
money and private interests [29:1].
This is further amplified by the preamble of Circular A-122
which explains that Federal money used for lobbying purposes
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"distorts the political process" and gives grantees and con-
tractors an advantage over groups with different political
aims [18:7]. Whatever the actual facts, the appearance of
Government support for subsidized positions through lobbying
reimbursement is not viewed as being in the Government's best
interest [15:38]. On a less political plane, the avowed aim
of Circular A-122 was to establish a comprehensive Government-
wide set of cost principles to ensure Government funds are
not used for lobbying purposes [22:1]. Answering their cri-
tics that existing regulations are sufficient, 0MB cites both
GAO and the various Government Inspectors General's comments
regarding the inadequacy of the existing regulations [30].
Not everyone is convinced of the stated aims and inten-
tions of 0MB. Some members of Congress suspect that the ul-
terior motive of 0MB was to "defund" liberal groups not liked
by the current Administration rather than to stop the use of
lobbying with Federal funds [31]. Congressman Waxman expressed
his disdain for 0MB' s approach by stating, "it sounds to me
like you are just throwing up trial balloons and seeing who
shoots at them. Don't you do some study in advance to try
to determine whether the proposals you put forward make sense
or not" [15:54]
?
An important aspect of the purpose of the regulations is
what the proposed regulations do not do. The proposals of
both 0MB and DOD do not attempt to voice an opinion on the
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merits or lack of them concerning lobbying. There is no
attempt to restrict the amount of lobbying a particular
grantee or contractor can do [17:705]. The regulation is
only on cost recoverability
. In issuing their original pro-
posal, 0MB stated that "the administration will continue to
award grants and contracts to those parties who are most
effective in fulfilling statuatory purposes (and that) poli-
tical advocacy groups may continue to receive grant and con-
tract awards" [32:3350]. Another important concept is that
the regulations do not apply to individuals receiving some
type of Government compensation but only to grantees and
contractors [15:46].
While the original 0MB proposal was touted as a "compre-
hensive Government-wide policy" , it was not perceived by
Senator Durenberger to have achieved that result. Therefore,
his bill was designed to provide legislative guidance to the
executive agencies to provide a true Government-wide policy
[33]. The failure of the executive agencies to reach an ac-
ceptable consensus brought about Congressional action. With
the latest uniform cost principles issued by 0MB and the other
agencies, the necessity of the Durenberger legislation has
been questioned.
D. REGULATION VERSUS LEGISLATION OF LOBBYING
As seen in the previous section, the question of which
branch of the Federal Government should introduce restrictions
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on lobbying costs is an important issue. 0MB has continuous-
ly expressed the view that it is their role to administer
grants, and that Congressional action is not needed [20].
The rationale for the 0MB position is as follows:
1. "delegated authority from Congress and the President
to manage the Executive Branch with a view toward economy
and efficiency, as it affects the agencies' exercis<=: of
their grant administration function" [17:734]
2. the first amendment of the Constitution, criminal stat-
utory restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 1913, and several Congres-
sional appropriation riders regarding the use of appropriated
funds for lobbying [34:5]
3. The Budget and Accounting Act and The Budget and Account-
ing Procedures Act which has been exercised through previous
Circulars and upheld by the Justice Department [15:44].
0MB ' s view on its authority to issue a cost principle on
lobbying is not shared by everyone. Many Congressmen believe
that 0MB has misused their authority to regulate grants in
this area and that it is an institutional prerogative of Con-
gress to handle this issue [35]. Others are of the opinion
that if the January 1983 proposal by 0MB had not been so sweep-
ing and controversial, this entire issue would not have been
raised by the Congress [31]. A legal opinion expressed by
Jack H. Maskell of the Congressional Research Service states
that
33
no authority cited by 0MB appears to delegate legislative
authority to the agency to institute a policy of Govern-
ment "neutrality" in prohibiting the use of Government
funds to further private speech and petition activities,
nor any specific or general authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to broadly construe applicable provisions
of law affecting the legal rights and responsibilities of
private organizations in this area (34:ii].
Senator Durenberger, in formulating his legislation, has taken
the position that comprehensive policies on lobbying should
be legislated rather than regulated by the executive agencies
[36:3]. The American Civil Liberties Union and many other
organizations have supported this position in testimony and
correspondence to 0MB [15:199].
Another position taken by many critics of the lobbying
cost principles relies on the assumption that Congress has
taken a position on this issue through various actions and
inactions. As Maskell points out, "0MB may be instituting
new restrictions on grantee and contractor advocacy activity
substantially beyond those which Congress envisioned" [34:12].
Another view supports the premise that, in the absence of
Congressional action, it is improper for 0MB to unilaterally
presume that the use of Government funding for lobbying is
unallowable [37]. Since there have been various Congressional
statutes on lobbying, 0MB ' s position that these laws are not
comprehensive has also been attacked. "That theory may be
faulted as an assertion of administrative authority to adopt
controls that Congress repeatedly chose not to adopt" [38:1].
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The issue of Circular A-122's compatability with existing
legislation has raised additional issues in the arena of reg-
ulation versus legislation. The position of 0MB is that their
proposal does not override statutory law, specifically allows
any costs where Congress has directly authorized the use of
appropriated funds for unallowable activities, and is consis-
tent with the broad thrust of Congressional policy on lobbying
[17:735]. This position has been attacked by the GAO and le-
gal experts. They feel that Congressional riders on appropri-
ation bills making lobbying costs unallowable have applied
only to the Federal agencies and not contractors or grant
recipients [31]. The riders have been attached to only pro-
hibit Government employees from lobbying Congress for approval
of specific agency programs. Maskell also points to the fact
that appropriation riders only apply to "publicity and propa-
ganda" campaigns directed at "legislation pending before Con-
gress" and not the other areas that Circular A-122 has regulated
[34:i].
In addition to the debate over who has the regulatory
authority in the lobbying issue, the rationale behind why the
executive agencies desire regulation over legislation has had
an affect on Executive action to date. It is perceived by
the DOD that the regulatory approach gives them more flexi-
bility. A law is seen to have potential for ambiguity with
the intent having to be determined through applications [28].
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Also, there exists the strong possibility of an adversarial
relationship between the agencies and the private sector over
the lobbying issue [28].
E. SUMMARY
The understanding of cost allowability, the type of con-
tracts that will be affected, the express purpose of the exec-
utive agencies' proposals, and the controversy of regulation
versus legislation are keys in correctly analyzing the regu-
lation of lobby costs. While the first three are rather
straightforward and well documented in the regulations, the
resolution of the regulatory versus legislation approach to
the allowability of lobbying costs is beyond the scope of this
thesis. It has been presented as background material to en-




IV. GENERAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE REGULATIONS
A. APPLICABILITY
The question of which organizations are required to comply
with the regulations has been used as an issue by the critics
of both 0MB Circular A-122 and the DOD regulations. Circular
A-122 applies to all non-profit grantees and non-profit con-
tractors except hospitals, institutions of higher education,
state and local governments, unions, and many research organ-
izations [39]. The FAR provisions apply to all prime and sub-
contractors with primarily the same exceptions noted above.
In both cases, the proposals will affect grants, contracts,
and other agreements entered into after the effective date
of the regulations being issued [32:2248].
The exemptions mentioned previously appear as discrim-
inatory to many affected organizations and contrary to the
expressed aims of the proposals. A group most critical of
the 0MB position, 0MB WATCH, voiced concerns over the exemp-
tion of hospitals, higher education, and state and local
governments who, it says, receive over 95% of all Federal
grants [39]. In the area of research funding, the exclusion
of universities seems to give them a competitive advantage
over small businesses [15:256]. The exemption of unions is
seen as being highly discriminatory by many and it has been
theorized that this exclusion will give the unions an unfair
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advantage in the political arena [15:186,256]. It was never
made clear by the critics as to how the union exclusion would
affect any grant or contract.
On a more general level, a controversy exists concerning
the application of the same type of regulations to both non-
profit and contractor organizations. The non-profit viewpoint
is that they should be exempted from lobbying restrictions
while contractor lobbying is inappropriate, since it only bene-
fits the contractor [39]. 0MB WATCH takes the position that
"a non-profit organization's advocacy on behalf of a disad-
vantaged segment of the population ... should not be put on the
same footing as a large contractor's entertaining Congressmen
to win votes for new weapon systems [39]. On the contracting
side, it is felt that Government contractors should not be
subjected to the same regulations intended for the "conduct
of public charities" [15:399].
Achieving a consensus on a lobbying regulation by every-
one seems impossible. If the aim is to ensure Federal funds
are not used for lobbying, exempting certain groups and organ-
izations appears to create unnecessary conflict. A lobbying
cost principle that is equally applied to all who receive
Federal contracts and grants might eliminate any concern over




0MB has taken the position that new regulations on lobby-
ing are necessary due to the difficulty in enforcing the cur-
rent laws and regulations [15:37]. According to their viewpoint,
there are no enforceable restrictions already in place. This
position has been attacked on the grounds that the failure
to enforce existing laws and regulations is a poor reason to
institute new regulations [15:186]. Research has failed to
discover any existing legislation or regulation that disallows
lobbying costs except in the most direct sense of lobbying,
i.e., direct attempts to influence legislation.
The primary vehicle for enforcement of the proposed regu-
lations is voluntary compliance by grantees and contractors
[17:735]. The concept that this reliance on the good faith
of the organizations will make enforceability difficult if
not impossible, is not seen as a major problem by the exec-
utive agencies [20]. Senator Durenberger, utilizing the same
scope of enforceability in his legislation, also does not
foresee major problems. His view is that "auditors will con-
tinue to have the discretion to disallow reimbursement for
such activity when it is not an ordinary and necessary expen-
diture within the purpose of the grant or contract" [33].
Enforcing the regulations by placing the burden on the organ-
izations by making them certify the allowability of any lobby-
ing related costs for reimbursement, is seen as a proper
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alternative or precursor to costly and extensive enforcement
[40: 15] .
The penalties for lack of compliance with the regulations
are divided into minor or unintentional violations and more
serious cases [17:735]. For the less serious infractions,
the organization will be required to reimburse the particular
Federal agency for the misspent funds [17:735]. For cases
considered more serious, contracts and grants can be suspended
or terminated and offenders can be debarred or suspended from
further awards [17:735].
Although the Government agencies proposing the regulations
are not concerned with the reporting requirements, the lack
of required documentation has raised the question of enforce-
ability. The DOD Inspector General in reviewing the prior
DOD proposal stated that "without time logs and other docu-
mentation of the activities engaged in, it will be impossible
to determine, after the fact, the percentage of time an em-
ployee devoted to lobbying and related activities" making a
large portion of the cost principle unenforceable [26:2].
Others have also argued that self certification makes the cost
principles difficult, if not impossible, to enforce [41:817].
The question of how to enforce the regulations must be
weighed against the cost of more rigid requirements. A reg-
ulation that is totally disregarded due to its lack of enforce-
ment serves little purpose. However, the cost of maintaining
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extensive documentation would be very high and passed on to
the Government as an allowable cost [42]. To implement the
proposals as written, with the option of more stringent doc-
umentation procedures if considered necessary in the future,
would balance the enforcement issue and be a start in regu-
lating lobbying costs.
C. EFFECT ON ACQUISITION COSTS AND CONTRACTOR COSTS
The question of whether or not a regulation is cost ef-
fective has long been an issue concerning the merits of the
particular regulation. In analyzing the lobbying cost prin-
ciples, one would need to know the amount of money one would
save by imposing the restrictions and the cost to implement
the proposed regulations. The question of the amount of money
being charged to the Government for lobbying has not been
totally addressed. In Congressional Hearings, representatives
of GAO and 0MB testified that neither has conducted any study
to quantify lobbying costs [15:54,67]. In his analysis of
the proposed Circular A-122, Maskell points out that "there
were no hearings, findings, nor record of abuses, or waste
of Government funds in the area of lobbying... to demonstrate
the cost savings or increase in efficiency and economy to the
Government which would result from these restrictions" [34:18],
The effect the regulations will have on Government acqui-
sition costs in the contract administration area is a divided
issue between the Federal Government and the private sector.
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0MB representatives do not foresee any increase in contract
administration costs [20]. The Director of the Defense
Acquisition Regulatory System, James Brannan, also sees no
effect on contract administration costs [43]. The Navy DAR
Council Representative, Mr. Ed Williamson, does not foresee
any increase in audit costs with the new regulations, but he
did foresee the possibility of an effect on other' administra-
tive costs [28]. Although he did not view the cost increases
as major, Mr. Williamson felt that accounting costs might rise
in the time allocation and record Iceeping areas [28].
The private sector did not share the opinion of the Gov-
ernment officials and felt that contract adiministration costs
would definitely rise. The magnitude of the cost increase
was felt to depend on the outloolc and attitude of auditors
as interpretations were made of the gray areas in the regula-
tions [44]. Many contractors feel that the ambiguity of the
regulations will lead to expensive and time-consuming disputes
over whether actions of legislative liaison are lobbying re-
lated or normal allowable business practices [45:2].
A particular cost item in the regulations that the private
sector viewed as increasing acquisition costs to the Govern-
ment centered around the Defense Department's prior disallow-
ance of all local and state lobbying costs. The prevailing
industry opinion is that local and state lobbying is aimed
at reducing contractor operating costs and improving contract
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efficiency [46:3]. The results of these endeavors would be
of direct benefit to the Government and reduce costs through-
out the acquisition process. This issue has been resolved
with disallowance of state and local lobbying being deleted
from the FAR proposal.
The monetary effect of the profits of industry is another
area where the quantifying of costs has not been thoroughly
conducted. Interviews with representatives of Lockheed, Ford
Aerospace, and Boeing indicated that there was not enough data
available at this time due to the relative newness of the DOD
regulations [42,44,47]. It was, however, generally agreed
throughout the private sector that these proposals would in-
crease the cost of doing business with the Government [14:2].
An unnamed official of a large defense contractor was quoted
as estimating the proposals prior to the November change could
cost his company approximately twenty million dollars per year
[29:372]
.
The consensus in the defense industry is that the regula-
tions will have direct cost impacts on all levels of acquisi-
tion. The taxpayer is seen as the direct recipient of these
costs in the long run [15:179]. The Council of Defense and
Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) is of the opinion that
costs of defense programs will increase due to these regula-
tions in four specific areas. These are a reduction in the
flow of information to ensure the acquisition of the best
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weapon systems, a reduction in competition, a reduction in
industry participation in the defense mobilization base, and
a limiting of capital available for investment in producti-
vity enhancement [15:39].
The ultimate question of the effect on acquisition costs
concerning the lobbying regulations will not be answered un-
til they are fully implemented and data is collected and ana-
lyzed. Although costs should be taken into account with the
implementation of every Government regulation, the fundamen-
tal question of the overall legitimacy of the allowability
of lobbying costs appears- to have more bearing on the issue.
This question, rather than the cost effectiveness, is the one
that should be addressed.
D. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGENCY REGULATIONS
As previously mentioned, the DOD proposal on lobbying was
more restrictive than that of 0MB, the other Federal agencies,
and the current proposals. There are four areas where costs
were deemed unallowable in the Defense Regulations but not
in those of 0MB, GSA, and NASA.
1
. Local lobbying activities
Circular A-122 has not made these costs unallowable because
it is felt "there is no rigorous separation between legisla-
tive and Executive branches" at the local level [17:733].
This lack of separation would make any regulation of these
lobbying costs difficult to enforce.
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2. Lobbying and related activities at the state level
Circular A-122 has not made these costs unallowable when
the lobbying activity directly affects the ability of the or-
ganization or cost to the organization of grant or contract
performance [17:731].
3. Providing technical advice or assistance to Congress
or state legislatures in response to a written request
4. Legislative liaison activities
DOD did not give any specific reasons for the position
they have taken on these differences [48:5]. The primary mo-
tivation behind the more restrictive cost principle was the
personal view on the lobbying issue of Defense Secretary
Weinberger [43]. His strict beliefs that the DOD policy was
the proper approach to the lobbying issue created the discre-
pancies in the regulations. Secretary Weinberger has not made
any statements as to v/hy DOD changed its approach, and one
would have to wonder if it was for political expediency rather
than a change in beliefs.
The stricter application by DOD has been attacked both
in Congress and by private industry. Senator Durenberger '
s
opinion is that, without any evidence of "programatic reasons",
all the Federal agencies should utilize the same standards
[36:2]. Private industry raised the issue of inequitable
treatment, and felt that the Government "will have failed to
meet its public policy obligations" if the regulations are
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not the same [49:7]. Citing the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy Act, as amended by Public Law 98-191 and Exec-
utive Order 12352, Federal Procurement Reforms dated 17 March
1982, the argument was made that both the President and Con-
gress had stressed the desire for uniform procurement poli-
cies [48:5]. The differences were categorized as "punitive,
discriminatory, and unfair" by one private sector critic [50:4]
The differences between the DOD regulations and those of
the other agencies were attac]<:ed on the basis of costs. The
possibility of maintaining separate accounting systems for
companies that deal with defense and non-defense contracts
[51] and the use of multiple overhead rates [52:2] are seen
as unnecessary expenses. While not being totally convinced
of the necessity for any regulation, the adjustment to a sin-
gle regulation is considered highly desireable [45].
The current proposals have alleviated all these major
differences between the agency regulations. However, it is
important to realize the initial position of DOD on the lob-
bying issue. If DOD in the future decides that the joint reg-
ulations do not achieve their desired intent, there is the
possibility the particulars noted might be reinstated in the
cost restrictions.
One of the main reasons for Senator Durenberger ' s bill
was the inability of the executive agencies to agree on the
scope of their lobbying regulations [53:117]. Senator
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Durenberger ' s bill does not call for strict uniformity by
agencies, but would require justification on the basis of
program needs for any variant in conformance [53:117]. The
Durenberger legislation would not restrict legislative liai-
son, local lobbying and most state lobbying, and would not
require a request for technical advice and assistance to be
in writing [24:2] .
E. SUMMARY
The questions of how the lobbying regulations should be
applied to various organizations, how they should be enforced,
what the overall costs will be in the acquisition cycle, and
to what degree should there be differences among executive
agency proposals have been addressed in this chapter. It is
necessary to obtain an understanding of these general issues
that would apply to any lobbying regulation, prior to examin-
ing the specific aspects of the current proposals.
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V. CONGRESSIONAL, EXECUTIVE, INDUSTRY INTERACTION
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The initial proposed revision to 0MB Circular A-122 in
January 1983 was attacked by critics on constitutional grounds.
With the latest changes, many of the areas where constitution-
al questions were raised were deleted [34:3]. This did not,
however, negate the constitutional issue. In general, it is
felt that the proposal violates certain First Amendment rights
and other constitutional rights.
The Office of Management and Budget's position is that
the proposal is "designed to balance the First Amendment rights
of federal grantees and contractors with the legitimate gov-
ernmental interests of ensuring that the Government does not
subsidize, directly or indirectly, the political advocacy ac-
tivities of private groups or institutions" [32:3348]. In
defending its position against critics declaring it is vio-
lating free speech, Mr. Wright testified that the issue is
what will be reimbursed, and not what will be allowed to be
said [15:56]. The Supreme Court Decision, Regan V Taxation
with Representation of Washington
,
stated that the Federal
Government "is not required by the First Amendment to subsi-
dize lobbying. We again reject the 'notion that First Amend-
ment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are
subsidized by the State'" [22:10].
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The position taken by 0MB is not without its supporters.
It is felt by some that the 0MB proposal will protect the
First Amendment rights of the public in its goal to stop the
subsidizing of lobbying [15:417]. Others feel there is no
violation of any First Amendment rights because it is non-
discriminatory in nature, "does not advance or control any
political opinion or belief," and does not interfere with the
voting process [40:4].
These arguments have not been compelling enough to con-
vince many critics of the constitutional questions raised by
the proposal. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) feels
the language of the regulations is vague and could lead to
alternative interpretations that violate the First Amendment
[54:4]. They specifically feel constitutional problems exist
on the following grounds:
1. "could be read to require a Federal contractor or grantee
to disclose its political activities to the Federal Govern-
ment regardless of whether the contractor or grantee sought
recovery from the Government of any cost associated with
such activities, and to disclose all funding sources
2. "the definition of 'unallowable' political activity re-
mains impermissibly vague ... encouraging arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application of the definition by Federal agencies
3. "legitimate ground exists for concern that 0MB ' s true
aim is to suppress expression as such... a forbidden goal
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4. "the rule would make the use of Federal contract and
grant funds for certain political activities allowable only
for those who, presumably on the basis of the content of
their message, can obtain from Congress, on an ad hoc basis,
a special invitation to engage in those activities at Gov-
ernment expense
5. "binding advance agreements ... is a charter for prior
censorship" [54:4,5,17].
Maskell, in his article, agreed with many of the points
in the ACLU report and, as previously mentioned, attacked 0MB'
s
authority to regulate lobbying costs. Another constitutional
issue raised is the retroactive disallowance of all previously
allowable costs after an organization decides to lobby [35].
This is seen by both industry and Congress as being highly
unfair if not illegal [42].
As previously stated, it is beyond the scope of this thesis
to analyze the legal issues raised on the lobbying principles.
Throughout the research, many Supreme Court and other judicial
decisions were cited by both supporters and critics of the
regulations. The utilization of these cases to support varied
opinions of the constitutionality of the regulations leads
one to believe there has been no specific judicial guidance
to expressly cover the regulation of lobbying costs. There-
fore, it would seem logical that the executive agencies should
again review these cases to ensure they are not in direct
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violation. The regulations can then be issued and the courts
would then decide any legal violations if and when they are
directly raised.
B. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS/PERCEPTIONS OF LOBBYING
The political ramifications stirred by the executive agen-
cies' proposals on the regulating of lobbying costs is a sub-
jective issue that is difficult to analyze. Mr. Horowitz of
0MB emphasized this point by stating that "over the last 10
to 15 years, the interrelationship between what's public and
private--what ' s political and non-political--has become so
intertwined that separating them out becomes awfully hard"
[29:372]. Supporters of the regulations feel they are neces-
sary to maintain the Government's neutral political role in
administering grants and contracts. Without the proposals,
0MB feels the Federal Government is able to punish or reward
through Federal funding on the basis of an organization's
"political advocacy" [32:3348]. They feel that the regula-
ting of lobbying will achieve neutrality by eliminating this
possibility of political spoils [32:3348]. The lack of any
regulations on lobbying costs has been seen as creating an
impression of the Government supporting a particular politi-
cal ideology [40:2]. This can be viewed as the Government
preferring one political ideology over another through Gov-
ernment funding. By disallowing all lobbying costs, no poli-
tical ideology is deemed superior.
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This view of the necessity for the regulations to create
Government impartiality is not held by everyone. The regu-
lations are viewed by many as totally political and seen as
a grudge match between the Reagan Administration and non-profit
liberal groups [35], To a large extent, the politics has over-
shadowed the merits of the issues [35] . Congressman Tom Lantos
has called the proposal "symptomatic" of the Administration's
"narrow. .. ideological approach to social problems totally di-
vorced from reality" [55:502].
Support of the proposals, with the exception of their ap-
plicability to major defense contractors, has been divided
primarily on conservative versus liberal viewpoints. The pro-
posals have been categorized as a "conservative effort to de-
fund the left" [56] and a "concentrated effort to defund anyone
who is lil-cely to disagree with the Administration" [15:21].
As Congressman Frank stated " . . .we have people in the Exec-
utive Branch who want to make fundamental changes and they
don't want to be bothered by a lot of people who are going
to tell us what the effects of those changes are" [15:70].
A less emotional response by the critics of the proposals is
the fear that Government agencies would use the proposals to
solicit input only from "friendly organizations" who support
the Governmental views [14:11]. These particular arguments,
however, would appear to be difficult to substantiate due to
their application to all Federal grantees and contractors,
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including the more conservative large business enterprises
[34:iii]. The critics do not agree with this with Congress-
man Frank stating that "the fact that they have to get Lock-
heed, Boeing, and a few others, I think, is only a minor
inconvenience because they think they can figure our some
ways around it" [15:71]. Some Defense contractors feel that
DOD is being used by the Administration to keep from having
to compromise too much with non-profits and their supporters
in Congress; and without including all contractors and grant-
ees it would prove impossible to submit any lobbying regulation
[47].
In addition to the broad political implications, there
is much concern over the equality of the regulations in its
application to various groups, and its effect on the parti-
cipation of organizations in the political system. Congress-
woman Patricia Schroeder believes the proposals are purposefully
structured to "hurt liberal organizations more that conser-
vative ones, small businesses more than big businesses, and
poor organizations more than rich ones" [15:22]. The lobby-
ing regulations have also been seen as forcing most groups
to decide between political participation and accepting Gov-
ernment contracts and grants [57:30]. Prior to the latest
FAR revision, DOD ' s position was categorized as possibly making
contractors choose between having any contact with their Con-
gressmen or dealing with DOD [50:5].
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The disallowance of costs incurred in an organization's
support and administration of Political Action Committees is
another political area of contention. The opinion that Con-
gress "specifically permitted corporations to use their Gen-
eral Treasure funds to underwrite a PAC ' s administrative and
operational cost" [15:170] through the Federal Election Act
[38] has been a major argument of the corporations.
One of the primary areas of controversy that has changed
with the latest 0MB and FAR proposals concern the regulation
of state lobbying. Critics of the proposals felt it was not
the place of the Federal Government to dictate what was ap-
propriate lobbying at the state level. Senator Durenberger
in his views of the issue is of the opinion that the states
should be able to get waivers from 0MB if they do not desire
to have the Federal funding of lobbying activities restricted
[36:2] .
It will be impossible to ta>ce the political aspects out
of any regulations proposed to regulate lobbying. 0MB has
realized this and has indicated the necessity of support from
Congressmen Horton and Broo]<;s for the revision of 0MB A-122
to become a reality. An interesting sidelight in the politi-
cal aspect of lobbying regulations concerns an avowed critic
of both the 0MB and DOD proposals, Congresswoman Schroeder.
While attacking the regulations in hearings as being harsh
and punitive, Congresswoman Schroeder was publicly critical
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of a perceived lobbying movement by Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion. Calling for an investigation by DOD into their lobby-
ing activities, she questioned "whether the narrow, private
interests of a corporation should be defining national defense
policy" [58]. This tends to reinforce the notion that poli-
tical expediency has been more important than the actual mer-
its of the lobbying issue. As the Washington Post editorialized,
"under the new rules no one should expect the halls of Congress
to be left to the tourists" [59]. It appears that the poli-
tical right or wrong of lobbying depends on what the lobbyist
is lobbying for and the politicians' opinions of their views.
Some of the critics of the lobbying cost regulations feel
that the proposals are a direct attack on lobbyists in general.
They feel that the proposals are punitive because of the low
opinions many Government officials have of lobbyists. In
attacking the lobbying proposals. Congressman Horton stated,
"It's always fashionable to dump on lobbyists. As a social
group, they are generally held in low esteem. But ... lobbyists
perform a very valuable function by making us aware of the
concerns of people who are interested in the making of public
policy" [15:8]. Milton J. Socolar, speaking for the GAO,
agrees with Congressman Horton and feels that "lobbying is
not evil per se and is not an activity that "deserves puni-
tive treatment" [60:2]. It is evident that the political
philosophy of individuals concerning lobbying issues continually
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cause the focus of attention to be taken away from the issue
of whether it should be an allowable cost on grants and
contracts
.
C. TAX DOLLAR USAGE FOR LOBBYING
Almost everyone concerned with the 0MB and DOD proposals
on regulating lobbying agrees that tax dollars should not be
used to lobby Congress. Congressman Brooks, an avowed critic
of the proposals, agrees that "...Federal dollars should not
be spent by contractors and grantees to lobby the Congress"
[15:1]. The Council of Defense and Space Industry Associa-
tions (CODSIA) , another strong critic, also agreed with this
general premise and feels that "...the political process would
be distorted if politically-dependent contractors and grantees
could use Federal funds to support their goals" [49:1]. The
judicial system has also taken a stand on this in Haswell v
United States , 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct . cl . 1974 ) . The decision
stated that "...the U. S. Treasury should be neutral in poli-
tical affairs and the substantial activities directed to attempts
to influence legislation should not be subsidized" [40:4].
Although there is a strong consensus on the usage of tax dol-
lars for lobbying, there is controversy over how to regulate
lobbying and whether any regulation is necessary.
One of the major positions of the supporters of the agen-
cies' proposals is that it is not right for contractors and
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grantees to utilize tax dollars for causes that many taxpayers
do not agree with [22:9]. Citing the legal case of Abood v
Detroit Board of Education
,
431. U. S. 209, 235-36 (1977),
supporters point to the Court's decision of "taxpayers should
not be required, either directly or indirectly, to contribute
to the support of an ideological cause (they) may oppose" [40:7'
This point has been contested by opponents led by the American
Civil Liberties Union which stated that "any notion that a
taxpayer has some rights to insist that his tax dollars not
be spent on causes he opposes is obviously untenable" [61:588].
Again, there is no consensus.
An argument used by the critics of the proposals concerns
the status of funds that are distributed to contractors and
grantees. 0MB and DOD have stated that their aim is to ensure
that no appropriated funds are utilized for lobbying purposes.
Critics feel that once funds have been distributed by the exec-
utive agencies they are no longer considered appropriated funds
[34:9]. They, therefore, feel that technically contractors
are not spending Government money but their own money they
earned in performing the contract [44] . In refuting the exec-
utive agencies' claims that Congress has repeatedly stated
their intentions that tax dollars not be used for lobbying,
the critics have claimed that any specific legislation is only
applicable to the agencies. Throughout his analysis, Maskell
cited Federal court cases to show that any laws, specifically
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18 U.S.C. 1913, prohibiting lobbying have applied "only to
Federal officers and employees of Federal agencies, and not
to private individuals and organizations which receive grants
and contracts from a Governmental agency" [34:7].
The critics of the proposals have also raised the issue
that it is unfair for the executive agencies to prevent con-
tractors from participating in legislative liaison when the
agencies engage in this activity at the taxpayer's expense
[62:191]. Congressman Frank stated that "...it is inconsis-
tent for the administration to refuse to pay for political
advocacy when the White House has its own political advocate,
Edward Rollins" [55:500]. The ACLU advocates this point and
feels that "0MB has offered no explanation as to how the use
of Federal funds by contractors or grantees for political ad-
vocacy would distort 'the market place of ideas' more than
the use of Federal resources for such purposes by the Presi-
dent, Congress, or Government officials" [61:588]. While the
correctness of this position is extremely difficult to eval-
uate, it does not appear to this researcher to have a great
deal of merit. The concept of equating the necessary inter-
action of executive agencies and the legislative branch with
that of private organizations appears to be without any logi-
cal backing.
An issue that has finally been settled with the DOD agree-
ment to adopt 0MB' s policy is that of using tax dollars for
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local lobbying. Contractors put forth the argument that al-
most all of the local lobbying is for the benefit of the
Government [44] . This type of lobbying is conducted for stating
a position on zoning, fire and safety regulations, taxes, and
the like [44] and to improve the ability of a contractor to
perform the contract [47].
D. EFFECT ON FREE ENTERPRISE AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
The current changes to the 0MB and FAR proposals have alle-
viated many of the complaints business organizations had raised.
A prior area of controversy concerned legislative liaison re-
strictions imposed by DOD . Although this issue has been de-
cided in favor of allowing almost all legislative liaison
[23:749], the rationale for desiring these costs by industry
is important to understand the lobbying dilemma. The primary
argument voiced by almost every organization spokesman was
that legislative liaison was a normal cost of doing business
[63:4]. The knowledge gained by legislative liaison is viewed
as "the difference between taking advantage of new opportuni-
ties and missing them entirely" [49:2] and a requirement for
management in "their responsibility to the owners, employees,
customers, the Government and the public at large" [46:2].
Citing the "deduction for political advocacy in section 162(e)
of the internal revenue code" , CODSIA felt that Congress had
recognized the business necessity of legislative liaison [15:402]
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The effect of the proposals penalizing contractors and
grantees who do business with the Government [50:6] has been
an argument used by critics of the proposals. A picture of
profit degradation resulting in reduced productivity, reduced
plant modernization, and curtailment of competitive parity
has been envisioned by Government contractors [15:401].
Using an example of shipbuilding as an industry "almost total-
ly dependent on Federal contracts," [63:1] these proposals
are portrayed as putting them at a decided disadvantage to
their non-Government counterparts. A major concern of the
effect upon business operations centers around small busines-
ses. It is felt that smaller businesses will have a more dif-
ficult time than large businesses in absorbing the unallowable
lobbying costs [62:191]. It is perceived that small business
will have to either attempt to write off lobbying as a busi-
ness expense to commercial accounts if possible [44] , or pos-
sibly give up Government contracting business [55].
The major defense contractors feel that lobbying is a
necessary business expense and will continue regardless of
the regulations [42,44,47]. If the proposals are enacted,
there will be a necessary restriction of activities and an
isolation of expenditures to keep the irecord ]<;eeping costs
(:cwn [47] . One possible response by industry will be to try
for higher profits on Government contracts to compensate for
the lack of recoverability of lobbying costs.
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E. INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN CONGRESS, DOD , AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY
The critics of the executive agencies' proposals have uti-
lized the concept that the proposals will severely affect the
flow of information needed by Congress to decide public inter-
est [35]. This information flow is considered necessary by
many congressmen and the private sector. A major Congression-
al concern is that if this information flow is curtailed, they
will be hampered in representing their constituents [14:3].
Congressman Weiss testified that the proposals would threaten
"...the free flow of ideas, the sharing of diverse perspec-
tives, and the communication of factual information that help
mitigate the possibility of unaccountable, harmful, and ill-
advised Government decision making" [15:374]. Congressman
Horton testified that this "information enables Congress to
make far more informed and intelligent decisions" [15:8]. The
private sector feels that Congress needs the information it
supplies to ensure it procures the best weapon systems [62:191].
They also believe that the proposals limit their ability to
converse with their Congressmen on matters where there is no
intent to influence legislation [49:4]. Senator Durenberger
in presenting his legislation feels that it is better to "err,
if we must err, on the side of free and open dialog between
legislators and contractors and grantees" [33].
Both OMB and DOD do not see the information flow issue
as a major problem. OMB believes the information flow will
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not be inhibited because organizations can still communicate
using non-Government funds and that anything not strictly for-
bidden is allowable [20]. They feel that as a practical matter
it will have little effect [20]. Ed Williamson believes there
will be no effect on information flow because the Government
will pay through profits and that corporations will still sup-
ply the information whether they are reimbursed or not [28].
As the 0MB proposal was originally written, a key area
of concern was the requirement for a written request from a
Congressman to supply any information to Congress. The latest
revision has modified this requirement to "permit oral as well
as written requests, allow staff members as well as Congress-
men to make the request, and make Congressional Record notices
sufficient to invoke the exception" [23:749].
As previously mentioned, and evident from the information
presented in this chapter, it appears impossible to achieve
a consensus of opinion of the various issues surrounding the
regulation of lobbying costs. Since this is the case, it would
appear that a decision by Congress and the Executive Depart-
ment should be made on the merits of whether Federal funds
should be utilized for lobbying. Once this decision has been
reached, the proposals should be promulgated on the merits
of the various arguments expressed and then implemented. Turn-
ing the issue into a political football is only achieving more
controversy with no results. For the regulations to have any
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chance of success, the politics and parochial interests of
a few groups will have to be subjugated for the best regula-
tion applicable to everyone.
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VI. REACTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS
A. THE NECESSITY FOR THE REGULATIONS—HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM?
With the current lobbying proposals being set to go into
effect on May 29, 1984 [23:750], many critics are still not
convinced there was ever a need for the regulations in the
first place. Congressman Brooks reported that his initial
hearings in March of 1983 did not convince his Committee that
there was any evidence to support the necessity for any reg-
ulation and that the policies in effect at that time were
adequate [14:13]. At the hearings, the GAO representative
agreed with Congressman Broo]<:s and gave GAO ' s position of not
predicting any widespread problem necessitating regulation
[15:67]. Major defense contractors feel that not only are
the regulations not necessary but they will be counter-pro-
ductive to the procurement process. In its testimony to Con-
gressman Brook's committee, CODSIA embellished this notion.
They pointed out the following major flaws in the idea of the
lobbying cost regulations:
1. "they would decrease rather than promote full competi-
tion in procurement
2. "they would impair rather than improve the quality, effi-
ciency, economy, and performance of Government procurement
organizations and personnel
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3. "they would add rather than eliminate inconsistencies
in procurement laws, regulations, directives and other laws,
etc., relating to procurement
4. "they would add enormous complexity rather than greater
simplicity throughout procurement
5. "they would impede rather than promote economy, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness throughout Government procurement
organizations and operations
6. "they would greatly increase instead of minimizing dis-
ruptive effects of Government procurement on particular indus-
tries, areas, or occupations
7. "they would destroy rather than promote fair dealing
and equitable relationships among the parties in Government
contracting" [15:409].
A defense contractor representative felt that the regula-
tions were not beneficial due to his concept that DOD needs
contractor lobbying help to ensure a proper defense [44].
His reasoning was that due to lack of resources and time DOD
does not properly educate Congressional staffs on DOD procure-
ment to the detriment of major system acquisition [44]. The
attempt to regulate lobbying has been categorized as a "solu-
tion in search of a problem" [37] , "a document which solves
an unknown problem" [65:2], and "contrary to the administra-
tion's policy of reducing administrative burdens and regula-
tory control" [15:410].
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The executive agencies take the opposite view that the
regulations are necessary to solve the problem of Federal
funds being used for lobbying. Although their supporters are
not as vocal as their critics, the response to the November
1983 proposal "drew 93,600 comments" with approximately nine-
ty-four percent showing support [66]. 0MB has continuously
expressed the opinion that the public. Congress, and GAO have
identified abuses and that regulation is needed [32:3348].
Citing the lobbying campaign of the C-5A aircraft by Lockheed
and Boeing Corporations, 0MB reported that both companies
attempted to charge lobbying costs to the Government through
their overhead rates [15:35]. Mr. Wright also stated that,
"...commingling of lobbying activities with legitimate con-
tract work and the inability of the current system to enforce
rigorous distinctions (left) GAO unable to determine the a-
mount of employee time improperly used." [15:34] Senator
Durenberger also believes regulation is necessary. While not
necessarily agreeing with all the concerns of 0MB as evidenced
by his own legislation. Senator Durenberger has stated "that
it would constitute poor public policy to force withdrawal
of A-122 without replacing it with something better" [24:1].
A more vocal supporter of a lobbying cost principle feels that
"because many members of Congress have benefitted from these
(lobbying) activities, there has been no rush to regulate the
political behavior of these organizations" [15:412].
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This issue, like many of the issues concerning a policy
to regulate lobbying costs, is difficult to solve with any
type of quantitative data. Personal opinions are difficult
to refute and emotions many times tend to overcome a logical
approach to the problem. However, it appears there is solid
evidence that abuses of Federal funds in the lobbying area
have occurred. The question of the magnitude of the occur-
rences does not appear to be known to anyone fully. If they
are few, the proposed regulations will indeed solve a problem
that does not exist. If they are of any magnitude, however,
the savings can only be beneficial to the Government and the
taxpayers. This answer can be resolved only over time with
workable regulations in effect to monitor the Government savings
B. RECOMMENDED CHANGES
As it became evident that the executive agencies were not
going to totally withdraw the regulations in the storm of con-
troversy that was created, many of the vocal critics turned
to recommending changes to the regulations. One major defense
contractor representative felt that since there was going to
be some form of regulations no matter what the critics did,
the best strategy was to attempt to try to have the final pro-
duct be as permissive as possible [42]. With the latest re-
vision to both the 0MB and FAR proposals, it appears that this
strategy has been successful to a large degree. There are,
however, still areas where critics believe that further changes
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to reduce the impact of the regulations would be appropriate




One of the major issues throughout the attempt to for-
mulate a policy to regulate lobbying costs centered around
how to define lobbying. The executive agencies used politi-
cal advocacy, lobbying and related activities, and finally,
simply lobbying as the term they were defining. This was a
minor victory for the critics of the proposals who felt the
other terms would lead to confusion. However, some critics
do not feel that this concession was enough in this area.
Contractors believe that the tax code allowance of necessary
business expenses, with the exception of items precluded by
appropriation acts, should be the basis for defining unallow-
able lobbying costs [15:407]. The non-profit organizations
echo this sentiment and feel that the "definition of lobbying
applied by the Internal Revenue Code to nonprofit 501(c) 3 or-
ganizations" should be utilized in the regulations [18:4].
Since the April proposals by the executive agencies did not





Most of the primary matters of contention in the legis-
lative liaison area have been resolved with the April propo-
sals. The latest revisions resulted in both grantees and
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contractors being treated equally by the executive agencies
that have regulatory authority. The viewpoint of contrac-
tors that legislative liaison is a necessary cost of doing
business, information received through this activity is
necessary for a business to maintain its competitive position,
and Congress needs to hear more than the military voice to
make wise decisions [47], appears to have achieved its pur-
pose. The Congressional complaint that the Executive Depart-
ment does not have the right or authority to tell Congress
what it can or cannot see or hear [31] has also been over-
come with the latest revisions.
Another area where contractors and grantees desired
changes to the prior proposals concerned the procedure for
giving advice and assistance to Congress. It was felt that
a written request was not needed [44,47], and staff member
requests or a published public hearing in the Congressional
Record should be sufficient [36:2]. The April revisions have
alleviated these criticisms. An area that was criticized as
being too restrictive but not changed in the latest revisions
was that advice or assistance should be "technical" in nature
[48:2]. In the April proposal, this area was tightened some-
what to read that "information provided must be 'technical
and factual', information that is 'readily obtainable' and
which can readily be put in 'deliverable form' and conveyed
through 'hearing testimony, statements or letters'" [23:749].
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The final controversial legislative liaison area that contrac-
tors and grantees wanted changed concerned the treatment of
allowable costs incurred prior to a decision to lobby on the
issue. As the proposals were originally presented, all costs
were considered unallowable when lobbying was conducted. This
included otherwise allowable costs that were incurred prior
to any lobbying activity. Senator Durenberger is of the opin-
ion that this retroactivity on allowability determination is
not fair [36:1]. He feels that it would be "burdensome in
terms of paperwork" and would serve as a "disincentive for
organizations to lobby on legislative issues on which they
had previously conducted allowable legislative liaison" [36:1]
While the new proposals did not totally conform to this opin-
ion, they did make a substantial change. Under the new guide-
lines, "legislative liaison is unallowable only 'when such
activities are carried on in support of or in knowing prepara-
tion for an effort to engage in unallowable lobbying'" [23:749'
3 . Reporting Requirements
Almost all of the concerns about what records were
necessary to be maintained and what information was to be re-
ported concerning lobbying were alleviated with the November
1983 proposals by 0MB and DOD . However, Congressmen Brooks
and Horton are still not satisfied with the latest proposal
in this area. Their primary concern centers around the pro-
vision that "would require contractors and grantees to tell
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the Government how much they spend on lobbying and identify
those costs separately from other expenses" [66]. The two
Congressmen are still concerned with the true intentions of
the lobbying proposals. Their contention is:
"...the federal Government has no business asking that
information on the political activities of private or-
ganizations be separately identified when there is no
involvement of federal funds in these activities and
when such identification might subject these organiza-
tions to discriminatory treatment or other forms of
harassment..." [66]
While 0MB made many compromises on their initial proposals
to win the support of Congressmen Brooks and Horton, they do
not appear willing to concede this point [66]. Senator
Durenberger does not feel this particular part of the regu-
lation is a problem and GAO has stated that "federal agencies
need the information in order to make a proper determination
of an indirect cost rate" [23:749].
C. THE PROPOSALS ARE NOT FORCEFUL ENOUGH
While most of the criticisms levied against the 0MB and
DOD approach to lobbying cost regulation stressed that pro-
posals were too strict, there have been critics who have felt
the proposals are not adequate to control these costs. The
DOD Inspector General is on record as believing the cost prin-
ciples are poorly conceived and will not afford the Government
the needed protection from lobbying costs being charged to
DOD contracts [26:2]. An area that particularly bothers the
DOD Inspector General concerns the section which calls for
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the option of advance agreements between the Government and
contractors on the applicability of the regulations. In at-
tacking this provision, he stated that "if this proposed cost
principle is so unclear that it requires advance agreements
on interpretation or application it should be rewritten" [26:2].
His alternative solution is for DOD to maintain its current
cost principle contained in the DOD FAR Supplement [26:1].
The viewpoint of one of the conservative critics of the
proposals is that they are "a bastardized product of politi-
cal accommodation rather than the result of reliance on either
logic or principle" [67:46]. Feeling that the proposals will
not accomplish anything significant, he further stated that
"Mr. Reagan's team, by duc]<:ing its challenge and obscurring
the issues, may have escaped the noisy wrath of thousands of
left-wing groups which will not remain free to pic]<: the poc>c-
ets of the American people to underwrite their advocacy" [67:39].
D. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
With the latest revisions of the 0MB and FAR proposals
ready to go into effect on May 29, it appears that the exec-
utive agencies finally have a uniform cost principle to regu-
late lobbying costs. Categorized by 0MB as "the best consensus
we could get" [23:750], it is still not without its major cri-
tics. The future of Senator Durenberger ' s bill is unknown
at this time. An aide to the Senator feels that there are
two possible scenarios for the legislation, depending on final
72
public accceptance [35]. Continued controversy, which does
not appear too likely at this time, would create impetus for
Congressional action on either Senator Durenberger ' s bill or
substitute legislation [35]. With the bill satisfying a ma-
jority of the involved parties, the Durenberger bill is not
seen as having the required support or need for inactment [35
This is a result of a perceived lac]<: of support by both the
Democratic members of the House of Representatives and the
Administration [35].
The controversy that has been generated over the regula-
tions has been by and large resolved in favor of the initial
critics of the lobbying proposals. As was pointed out by an
observer over the outcry by the January 1983 proposal, "0MB
officials are getting a belated lesson on why recipients of
federal largess lobby in the first place: it works" [29:370].
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As a result of this study, the following conclusions are
presented:
Conclusion #1. The FAR gives adequate guidance for determin -
ing the allowability and allocability of lobbying costs.
Applying the guidance of the FAR to the regulation of
lobbying costs is equivalent to its application to other un-
allowable costs. The accounting concept is no different be-
tween lobbying and other unallowable costs and does not place
an undue burden on contractors.
Conclusion #2. There is no solid evidence that the intent
of the Executive Department was to do anything other than reg-
ulate the use of Federal funds for lobbying.
The claim of many critics that the purpose of the lobby-
ing regulations was to "defund the left" does not stand up
to scrutiny. The initial stricter application by DOD to de-
fense contractors refutes this contention.
Conclusion #3. The regulations on lobbying should apply equal -
ly to everyone.
If lobbying expenditures are deemed to be an unallowable
cost in Federal grants and contractors, they should be unallow-
able for all organizations. There is no evidence that any
one organization's lobbying contributes more to effective
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acquisition or efficiency in Government than another. For
fairness, the lobbying regulations should apply equally.
Conclusion #4. The enforceability of the regulations is a
valid concern.
Realiance on "goodwill" and "self certification" by con-
tractors to enforce the regulations could result in abuses
that will not be discovered by Government auditors. Without
access to all contractor records and the requirement to main-
tain complete records of lobbying activities, it will not be
possible to ensure the proper treatment of all lobbying costs.
Conclusion #5. The executive agencies do not know the amount
of lobbying costs that have been charged to Government contracts
In public testimony and private interviews, 0MB, DOD, and
GAO all admitted they did not know the magnitude of contractor
and grantee lobbying expenditures that have been charged to
Federal agencies. While there have been isolated audits of
specific organizations to discern these costs, there is no
evidence of a Government-wide effort to quantify these costs.
Conclusion #6. The Constitutional questions concerning the
regulations should be decided by the Judicial System.
Although the Executive and Congressional segments of the
Government should take Constitutional considerations into
account when formulating regulations and legislation, the
proper forum to answer these questions is the Judiciary. Ac-
cordingly, any Constitutional questions concerning the lobbying
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regulations should be decided by the courts, if and when, a
specific court case is raised.
Conclusion #7. Politics has played a dominant role in trying
to formulate lobbying regulations.
The political aspects of which branch of the Federal Gov-
ernment is responsible for formulating a lobbying cost prin-
ciple, which political ideologies would be affected the most
by the regulations, and the perceived effect the regulations
will have on individual rights appear to have overshadowed
the merits of the regulations.
Conclusion #8. The perceived effect of the regulations on
the flow of information between contractors and Congress is
illusionary
.
Interviews with defense contractor representatives and
DOD acquisition policy personnel indicated that defense con-
tractors would still provide Congress with information regard-
less of the allowability of costs. Contractors feel they must
communicate with Congress to ensure their competitive position
in their industries.
Conclusion #9. The requirement that any allowable information
supplied to Congress by contractors and grantees predicated
on a written request is not necessary and could become dis -
criminatory in nature.
If it is considered an allowable cost activity to supply
information to Congress, a written request requirement could
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become a simple form letter sent to everyone who might be re-
motely connected to a Congressional hearing. The expense of
the administration of these requests could become costly and
burdensome to both Congress and the private sector. In addi-
tion, the written request requirement could be used to pick
and choose the information Congress would hear based solely
on political considerations.
Conclusion #10. The regulations are necessary to ensure there
is not an abuse by contrators and grantees in the use of Fed -
eral funds for lobbying.
Although the exact amount of Government funding that is
subsidizing lobbying is not known, there has been evidence
of abuse in this area. To ensure that this does not continue,
the regulation of lobbying costs is necessary.
Conclusion #11. The critics of the regulations have achieved
most of their goals professed in their oppositions to the
regulations
.
The latest proposals by 0MB and DOD issued on 27 April
1984 have acquiessed on almost all the controversial issues
in the preceding proposals. With few exceptions, the result-
ing product on the lobbying cost principle was highly satis-
factory to a majority of the involved organizations.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research, the following recommenda-
tions are offered:
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Recommendation #1. 0MB and POD should implement the proposed
regulations as quickly as possible.
There has been a fifteen month delay from the initial 0MB
proposal. Any more delay to further modify the regulations
does not appear to serve any purpose. The regulations are
needed and must be implemented to conduct any further research
into the lobbying cost issue.
Recommendation #2. Utilizing the required indirect cost pro -
posal requirement on lobbying costs, POD should monitor amounts
reported by contractors on legislative liaison, state, and
local lobbying.
Since no one in POP appears to have data on the magnitude
of lobbying expenditures by contractors, this data is neces-
sary to truly ascertain if the proposed regulations are effec-
tive. This could be done by contracting offices reporting
this information to a centralized point in POP for compilation.
Reporting requirements should be as simplified as possible
to achieve the desired results and not add another burden to
contracting activities. This will enable POP to make a ration-
al evaluation on the dollars being used for lobbying and whether
modifications to the regulations are necessary.
Recommendation #3. Personnel involved in auditing should re -
port any actual problems encountered in enforcing the regula -
tions as they are written.
78
The many concerns mentioned on the enforceability of the
regulations should not be ignored after implementation. To
ensure that the regulations achieve the desired control of
Federal funding of lobbying, the enforceability question should
be re-examined after audits have been conducted.
Recommendation #4. No further action should be taken on S.2251.
Regulation by the executive agencies should be utilized
to enforce a lobbying cost principle instead of the legisla-
tive approach of S.2251. It is the function of the executive
agencies to regulate the acquisition process and Congressional
intervention might set a bad precedent. If Congress legislates
one unallowable cost, it might seem necessary for them to legis-
late all regulations involving the acquisition process. This
would be both burdensome to Congress and would severely hamper
the agencies in their administration of grants and contracts.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . What effect will the proposed changes to Federal reg -
ulations concerning the allowability of lobbying costs have
on the relationship between private industry and the Federal
Government? With the latest proposed change to the FAR, most
of the concerns of private industry have been satisfied. This
has resulted in little, if any, impact on how private industry
conducts its business with the Federal Government and should
not jeopardize any future relationships due to lobbying regulations
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2. What is the definition and applicability of lobbying
costs according to law and regulation? Chapters II and III
of this thesis address this question. The definition of lob-
bying costs have evolved through various laws and regulations
to its current usage in the April 1984 executive agency pro-
posals and the Internal Revenue Code.
3. What are the political implications and ramifications
of proposed and current regulations? Chapters II and V address
these issues. The political implications are varied and have
played a significant role in dealing with the lobbying regu-
lation issue. At times, politics has overshadowed the merits
of the proposals to their detriment.
4. What is the position of private industry on the regu -
lations? Private industry appears satisfied with the latest
regulation of lobbying costs proposed in the April 1984 FAR
change. However, private industry was highly critical of many
aspects in the prior proposals and made this criticism well
known
.
5. What is the position of POD on the regulations? After
eighteen months of strong opposition to a less restrictive
approach on lobbying costs, DOD officially agreed to the April
1984 proposals. At the time of the agreement, there was no
specific reasons given by DOD as to why their position was
changed.
6. What effect will the regulations have on Congressional
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procedures? The latest proposals will not have any major
effect on the relationship between private industry and the
Congress. Lobbying will still continue and a major portion
of it will be unregulated. The legislation proposed by Sen-
ator Durenberger does not appear to have a great deal of
support and probably will not be enacted into law.
D. FURTHER RESEARCH
At this time there does not appear to be any need for
further research in the lobbying regulation area. Once the
regulations have been implemented and sufficient data has been
generated, this data should be reviewed to ascertain the
effectiveness of the regulations.
E. OBSERVATIONS BY THE AUTHOR
The political interference in the attempt by the executive
agencies to establish a cost principle to regulate lobbying
costs is symptomatic of the political involvement in a good
many of the acquisition policies formulated in the Federal
Government. This interference has, unfortunately, subjected
the merits of the lobbying policy to a secondary status of
importance and elevated the political aspects. This type of
attitude by the Congress and the private sector organizations
is severely hampering any true reforms in the acquisition pro-
cess. When Congress utilizes the defense procurement process
solely for political gains, costs will inevitable rise throughout
the procurement process and the wisdom and benefits of the
acquisition policies will be circumspect. The ability of de-
fense contractors to utilize their political power with Con-
gress to weaken DOD acquisition initiatives has brought about
similar results. In an era of rising defense budgets and the
large Federal deficit, any waste in the defense procurement
process can only exacerbate the problem. Allowing contractors
and grantees to continue most of their lobbying activities
with Federal funding has not reduced any costs or improved
the procurement process. Congressional micro-management of
the acquisition process that was becoming more evident in the
recent past is evident in its treatment of the lobbying pro-
posals. This micro-management has not reduced any costs or
improved the acquisiton process in any discernable manner.
As is evident by the manpower expense by 0MB and DOD required
to justify acquisition policy in regulating lobbying costs,
this action by Congress appears to be adding costs to the pro-
cess. To achieve optimum efficiency and effectiveness, the
executive departments should not be overly constrained by Con-
gress and the political influence of interest groups in deter-
mining acquisition policy.
The result of the fifteen month debate over the regulation
of lobbying costs is a regulation that applies to only a small
portion of the overall involved costs. Legislative liaison,
state lobbying, and local lobbying are business decisions that
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contractors should utilize earned profits to pay for. The
amount to spend should be determined by the long range bene-
fits accrued to the contractor and not by the ability to be
reimbursed by the Government for costs incurred. A cost type
of contract should be utilized to offset risk in developing
a product that is not exactly specified and is technological-
ly ambitious. These are the types of costs that should be
reimbursed--not costs that will only benefit the business
position of the contractor. The current proposals by 0MB and
DOD will not regulate most indirect lobbying and have lost
a majority of the effectiveness of the initiatives. A DOD
lobbying policy that was in effect for less than two years
has been scrapped with no large justification. Defense con-
tractor representatives admitted that they had no data as yet
on the effects of the DOD regulations.
The lack of a well-conceived initial proposal by 0MB
severely handicapped their goal of any effective lobbying reg-
ulation. It was too broad in scope and overly restrictive
in many areas. It created a broad coalition of opposition
that was too strong to overcome in the long run. This, coupled
with an inability of the executive agencies to agree on what
should be regulated, resulted in a cost proposal that appears
to regulate very little.
APPENDIX A
APRIL 27, 198 4 PROPOSED CHANGE TO 0MB CIRCULAR A- 122
1. Insert a new paragraph in attachment B, as follows:
"B21 Lobbying"
a. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Circular, costs
associated with the following activities are unallowable:
a. (1) Attempts to influence the outcomes of any Federal,
State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or simi-
lar procedure, through in kind or cash contributions, endorse-
ments, publicity, or similar activity;
a. (2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or
paying the expenses of a political party, campaign, politi-
cal action committee, or other organization established for
the purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections;
a. (3) Any attempt to influence: (i) The introduction of
Federal or state legislation; or (ii) the enactment or modi-
fication of any pending Federal or state legislation through
communication with any member or employee of the Congress or
state legislature (including efforts to influence State or
local officials to engage in similar lobbying activity) , or
with any government official or employee in connection with
a decision to sign or veto enrolled legislation;
a. (4) Any attempt to influence: (i) The introduction of
Federal or state legislation; or (ii) the enactment or modi-
fication of any pending Federal or state legislation by
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preparing, distributing or using publicity or propaganda, or
by urging members of the general public or any segment there-
of to contribute to or participate in any mass demonstration,
march, rally, fundraising drive, lobbying campaign or letter
writing or telephone campaign; or
a. (5) Legislative liaison activities, including attendance
at legislative sessions or committee hearings, gathering in-
formation regarding legislation, and analyzing the effect of
legislation, when such activities are carried on in support
of or in knowing preparation for an effort to engage in un-
allowable lobbying.
b. The following activities are excepted from the coverage
of subparagraph a:
b. (1) Providing a technical and factual presentation of
information on a topic directly related to the performance
of a grant, contract or other agreement through hearing tes-
timony, statements or letters to the Congress or a state le-
gislature, or subdivision, member, or cognizant staff member
thereof, in response to a documented request (including a
Congressional Record notice requesting testimony or state-
ments for the record at a regularly scheduled hearing) , made
by the recipient member, legislative body or subdivision, or
a cognizant staff member thereof; provided such information
is readily obtainable and can be readily put in deliverable
form; and further provided that costs under this section for
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travel, lodging or meals are unallowable unless incurred to
offer testimony at a regularly scheduled Congressional hear-
ing pursuant to a written request for such presentation made
by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
or Subcommittee conducting such hearing.
b. (2) Any lobbying made unallowable by section a. (3) to
influence State legislation in order to directly reduce the
cost, or to avoid material impairment of the organization's
authority to perform the grant, contract, or other agreement.
b. (3) Any activity specifically authorized by statute to
be undertaken with funds from the grant, contract, or other
agreement
.
c. (1) When an organization seeks reimbursement for indirect
costs, total lobbying costs shall be separately identified
in the indirect cost rate proposal, and thereafter treated
as other unallowable activity costs in accordance with the
procedures of paragraph B3 of Attachment A.
c. (2) Organizations shall submit as part of their annual
indirect cost rate proposal a certification that the require-
ments and standards of this paragraph have been complied with.
c. (3) Organizations shall maintain adequate records to
demonstrate that the determination of costs as being allow-
able or unallowable pursuant to paragraph B21 complies with
the requirements of this Circular.
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c. (4) Time logs, calendars, or similar records document-
ing the portion of an employee's time that is treated as an
indirect cost shall not be required for the purposes of com-
plying with subparagraph c, and the absence of such records
which are not kept pursuant to the discretion of the grantee
or contractor, will not serve as a basis for disallowing claims
of allowable costs by contesting estimates of unallowable lob-
bying time spent by employees during any calendar month unless:
(i) The employee engages in lobbying, as defined in subpara-
graphs a and b, more than 25% of his compensated hours of em-
ployment during that calendar month; or (ii) the organization
has materially misstated allowable or unallowable costs with-
in the preceding five year period.
c. (5) Agencies shall establish procedures for resolving
in advance, in consulation with 0MB, any significant questions
or disagreements concerning the interpretation or application
of paragraph B21. Any such advance resolution shall be bind-
ing in any subsequent settlements, audits or investigations
with respect to that grant or contract for purposes of inter-
pretation of this Circular; provided, however, that this shall
not be construed to prevent a contractor or grantee from con-
testing the lawfulness of such a determination.
2. Renumber subsequent paragraphs of Attachment B.
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APPENDIX B
APRIL 27, 1984 PROPOSED CHANGE TO FAR 31.205-22
1. Subsection 31.205-22 is revised to read as follows:
31.205-22 Lobbying costs.
(a) Costs associated with the following activities are un-
allowable :
(1) Attempts to influence the outcomes of any Federal, State,
or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure,
through in kind or cash contributions, endorsements, publicity,
or similar activities;
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or paying
the expenses of a political party, campaign, political action
committee, or other organization established for the purpose
of influencing the outcomes of elections;
(3) Any attempt to influence (i) the introduction of Federal
or state legislation, or (ii) the enactment or modification
of any pending Federal or state legislation through communi-
cation with any member or employee of the Congress or state
legislature (including efforts to influence state or local
officials to engage in similar lobbying activity) , or with
any government official or employee in connection with a de-
cision to sign or veto enrolled legislation;
(4) Any attempt to influence (i) the introduction of Fed-
eral or state legislation, or (ii) the enactment or modifica-
tion of any pending Federal or state legislation by preparing,
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distributing or using publicity or propaganda, or by urging
members of the general public or any segment thereof to con-
tribute to or participate in any mass demonstration, march,
rally, fund raising drive, lobbying campaign or letter writing
or telephone campaign; or
(5) Legislative liaison activities, including attendance
at legislative sessions or committee hearings, gathering in-
formation regarding legislation, and analyzing the effect of
legislation, when such activities are carried on in support
of or in knowing preparation for an effort to engage in un-
allowable activities.
(b) The following activities are excepted from the coverage
of (a) above:
(1) Providing a technical and factual presentation of in-
formation on a topic directly related to the performance of
a contract through hearing testimony, statements or letters
to the Congress or a state legislature, or subdivision, mem-
ber, or cognizant staff member thereof, in response to a doc-
umented request (including a Congressional Record notice
requesting testimony or statements for the record at a regu-
larly scheduled hearing) made by the recipient member, legis-
lative body or subdivision, or a cognizant member thereof;
provided such information is readily obtainable and can be
readily put in deliverable form; and further provided that
costs under this section for transportation, lodging or meals
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are unallowable unless incurred for the purpose of offering
testimony at a regularly scheduled Congressional hearing pur-
suant to a written request for such presentation made by the
Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of the Committee or Sub-
committee conducting such hearing.
(2) Any lobbying made unallowable by (a) (3) above to in-
fluence state legislation in order to directly reduce con-
tract cost, or to avoid material impairment of the contractor's
authority to perform the contract.
(3) Any activity specifically authorized by statute to be
undertaken with funds from the contract.
(c) When a contractor seeks reimbursement for indirect costs,
total lobbying costs shall be separately identified in the
indirect cost rate proposal, and thereafter treated as other
unallowable activity costs.
(d) Contractors shall submit as part of their annual indirect
cost rate proposals a certification that the requirements and
standards of this subsection have been complied with.
(e) Contractors shall maintain adequate records to demon-
strate that the certification of costs as being allowable or
unallowable pursuant to this subsection complies with the re-
quirements of this subsection.
(f) Time logs, calendars, or similar records documenting
the portion of an employee's time that is treated as an in-
direct cost shall not be required for the purposes of complying
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with this subsection, and the absence of such records which
are not kept pursuant to the discretion of the contractor will
not serve as a basis for disallowing allowable costs by con-
testing estimates of unallowable lobbying time spent by em-
ployees during any calendar month unless; (1) the employee
engages in lobbying, as defined in (a) and (b) above, more
than 25% of the employee's compensated hours of employment
during that calendar month; or (2) the organization has mater-
ially misstated allowable or unallowable costs within the pre-
ceding five year period.
(g) Existing procedures should be utilized to resolve in
advance any significant questions or disagreements concerning
the interpretation or application of this subsection.
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aFfJiINUlA L.
UNIFORM LOBBYING COST PRINCIPLES ACT H
OF 1984
98th congress
2d Session S. 2251
To establish a uniform Federal policy governing the use of Federal funds for
lobbying by contractors and grantees, and to provide for the disclosure to
Members of Congress of the costs of certain exempted activities.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 2 (legislative day, Janizary 30). 1984
Mr. DuRENBERGER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs
A BILL
To establish a uniform Federal policy governing the use of
Federal funds for lobbying by contractors and grantees, and
to provide for the disclosure to Members of Congress of the
costs of certain exempted activities.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Uniform Lobb\ing Cost
4 Principles Act of 1984".
5 Sec. 2. Except as other\\ise provided under Federal
6 law, a commercial or nonprofit organization shall not allocate
7 the cost of influencing legislation to
—
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21 (1) a Federal or federally assisted grant or cooper-
2 ative agreement, other than a block grant; or
3 (2) a contract with a Federal agency, other than a
4 competitive firm fixed price contract.
5 DEFINITIONS
6 Sec. 3. (a) As used in this Act the term
—
7 (1) "influencing legislation", except as otherwise
8 pro\aded in paragraph (2), means
—
9 (A) any attempt to influence legislation
10 through tr}dng to affect the opinions of the gen-
ii eral public or any segment thereof, and
12 (B) any attempt to influence legislation
13 through communication with any member or em-
14 ployee of a legislative body, or with any govern-
15 ment official or employee who may participate in
16 the formulation of legislation,
IT (2) "influencing legislation" for the purpose of this
18 section, does not include
—
19 (A) making available the results of nonparti-
20 san analysis, study, or research;
21 (B) providing technical advice or assistance
22 (where such advice would otherwise constitute the
23 influencing of legislation) to a governmental body
24 or to a committee or a subdivision thereof in
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31 response to a request by any official or employee
2 of such body or subdivision, as the case may be;
3 (C) communication between an organization
4 and its bona fide members with respect to legisla-
5 tion or proposed legislation of direct interest to
6 the organization and such members, other than
7 communications described in subsection (b);
8 (D) any communication with a government
9 official or employee, other than
—
10 (i) a communication with a member or
11 employee of a legislative body (where such
12 communication would otherwise constitute
13 the influencing of legislation), or
14 (ii) a communication the principal pur-
15 pose of which is to influence legislation;
16 (E) any communication (where such commu-
17 nication would otherwise constitute the inllu-
18 encing of legislation) in connection with an
19 employee's service as an elected or appointed
20 government official or member of a governmental
21 advisory panel; and
22 (F) any communication (where such commu-
23 nication would otherwise constitute the influenc-
24 ing of State legislation)
—
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41 (i) in a State which has waived the ap-
2 plicability of this Act to such communication
3 pursuant to section 4(a) of this Act, or
4 (ii) with respect to a possible decision
5 by a governmental body or committee or
6 subdi\ision thereof which might affect the
7 ability of the organization or cost to the or-
8 ganization of performing any grant, coopera-
9 tive agreement, or contract described in
10 section 2 of this Act;
11 (3) "legislation" includes action with respect to
12 Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by the Con-
13 gress or any State legislature, or by the public in a
14 referendum, initiative constitutional amendment, or
15 similar items;
16 (4) "action", when used with respect to legisla-
17 tion, is limited to introduction, amendment, enactment,
18 defeat, or repeal;
19 (5) "making available" means the least costly
20 method of communicating the results of nonpartisan
21 analysis, study, or research to an official or employee
22 of a governmental body or committee or subdivision
23 thereof;
24 (6) "nonprofit organization" means any organiza-
25 tion described in sections 501 (c)(3) and (c)(4) of the
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51 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 501(c) (3)
2 and (4));
3 (7) "the cost of influencing legislation" means the
4 total of expenditures knowingly undertaken in direct
5 support of a communication when the purpose of such
6 communication is to influence legislation; and
7 (8) "governmental body" means a Federal, or
8 State executive or legislative body.
9 (b)(1) A communication between an organization and
10 any bona fide member of such organization to directly en-
11 courage such member to communicate as pro\ided in subsec-
12 tion (a)(1)(B) shall be treated as a communication described in
13 such subsection.
14 (2) A communication between an organization and any
15 bona fide member of such organization to directly encourage
16 such member to urge persons other than members to commu-
17 nicate as provided in either subparagraph (A) or (B) of para-
18 graph (1) shall be treated as a communication described in
19 paragraph (1)(A).
20 STATE WAIVER
21 Sec. 4. (a) A State may waive the application of this
22 Act to all communications which would otherwise constitute
23 the influencing of State legislation by notifying the Director
24 of Management and Budget of such election in wTiting.
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61 (b) Except as pro\'ided in section 3(a)(2)(F)(ii), nothing
2 in ttiis Act shall prohibit a State which has provided a notifi-
3 cation under subsection (a) from promulgating uniform rules
4 for the allocation of the cost of influencing State legislation
5 under federally assisted grants or cooperative agreements
6 which are administered by such State.
7 DISCLOSUEE OF FUNDING
8 Sec. 5. (a) Whenever the cost of an organization's tech-
9 nical ad\ice or assistance to a Member of Congress, or the
10 Member's staff, under section 3(a)(2)(B) will (1) be allocated
11 to a grant, agreement, or contract described in section 2,
12 pursuant to this Act, and (2) the amount so allocated will
13 exceed $100, the organization shall pro\ide a wiitten notice
14 to such Member setting forth the actual or estimated cost of
15 such advice or assistance, and specifying the particular grant,
16 agreement, or contract to which such costs will be allocated.
17 (b) This section shall not apply with respect to any
18 acti\ity which has been specifically authorized by Congress.
19 (c) WTienever the cost of a communication described in
20 subsection (a) will be allocated to more than one grant,
21 agreement, or contract, an organization may, in lieu of speci-
22 f}ing the particular Federal or federally assisted grant or
23 agreement, or the particular contract with a Federal agency,
24 to which such cost will be allocated, provide an estimate of
25 the percentage of the organization's total revenues which are
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71 derived from Federal or federally assisted grants or agree-
2 ments, or from contracts with a Federal agency.
3 ADMINISTRATION
4 Sec. 6. (a) The Director of the Office of Management
5 and Budget (hereinafter referred to as the "Director") shall
6 promulgate in full and open consultation with the heads of
7 other Federal agencies, interested commercial and nonprofit
8 organizations, and the Congress, such uniform guidelines as
9 are minimally necessary to carry out this Act. Such consulta-
10 tion shall include public hearings designed to educate affected
11 parties with respect to the applicability and intent of this Act.
12 (b) The heads of Federal agencies shall implement by
13 regulations the guidelines promulgated under subsection (a).
14 (c) The guidelines promulgated under subsection (a)
15 shall be developed in full accord with the Paperwork Reduc-
16 tion Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and chapter 6 of
17 title 5, United States Code.
18 (d) Prior to promulgating any guidelines under subsec-
19 tion (a), the Director shall identify and publicize any authori-
20 zation in the laws of the United States which permits any





2 Sec. 7. Notwithstanding any other pro\ision of law, any
3 portion of any Federal rule, regulation, circular, or guideline
4 which is in conflict with this Act is hereby superseded.
5 EFFECTIVE DATE






CHRONOLOGY OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION ON LOBBYING
1. December 1977 - Proposed Change to ASPR - never incorp-
orated into the regulations
2. November 1979 - Proposed Change to DAR - never incorpora-
ted into the Regulations
3. October 1981 - Original Lobbying Cost Principle DAR 15.205-51
4. November 1981 - Senate Bill S.1969 introduced - no action
taken by Congress
5. November 1982 - Change to DAR 15.205-51 - made legislative
liaison unallowable costs
6. November 1982 - GSA Lobbying Cost Principle FPR 1-15.205-52
7. January 1983 - 0MB Proposed Revision to Circular A-122,
DOD Proposed Change to DAR 15.205-51, and GSA Proposed
Change to FPR 1-15.205-52 - all withdrawn with no action
8. November 1983 - Reissuance of 0MB, DOD and GSA Proposals
9. January 1984 - Senate Bill S.2251 Introduced
10. April 1984 - FAR and DOD FAR Supplement Go Into Effect




1. Webster's Third International Dictionary
To conduct activities (as engaging in personal contacts
or the dissemination of information) with the objective
of influencing public officials and esp. members of a
legislative body with regard to legislation and other
policy decisions
2. Internal Revenue Service Code 26 USC 4911
Lobbying expenditures for the purpose of influencing
legislation
influencing legislation - (a) any attempt to in-
fluence any legislation through an attempt to
affect the opinions of the general public or any
segment thereof, and (b) any attempt to influence
any legislation through communication with any
member or employee of a legislative body, or with
any government official or employee who may par-
ticipate in the formulation of the legislation.
3. December 1977 Proposed Change to ASPR
Any activity or communication which is intended or de-
signed to directly influence Members of Congress, their
staffs or committee staffs to favor or oppose pending,
proposed or existing federal legislation or appropriation,
4. November 1979 Proposed Change to DAR
Any activity the purpose of which is to affect any
legislation or other official actions of the U. S.
Congress, its members and employees, either direct-
ly through employment of a third party or by encour-
aging its officers or employees to do so
5. October 1981 Revision to DAR
Any activity or communication which is intended or
designed to directly influence or to engage in any
campaign to encourage others to influence members
of the Congress, their staffs, or the staffs of
committees of the Congress to favor or oppose
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legislation, appropriations or other actions of the
Congress, its members or its committees, for the pro-
curement of specific supplies or services by the fed-
eral government.
6. November 1982 Revision to PAR, 4 November 1983 Proposed
Revision to PAR, and POD FAR Supplement Implemented 1 April
1984
Any activity including legislative liaison, or commun-
ication which is intended or designed to influence,
directly or indirectly, or to engage in any campaign
to encourage others to influence members of any legis-
lative body, their staffs, or the staffs of their com-
mittees to favor or oppose legislation, appropriations,
or other actions of the legislative body, its members,
or its committees.
7. November 1982 Revision to FPR, 4 November 1983 Proposed
Revision to FPR, and FAR Implemented 1 April 1984
Any activity or communication designed to directly in-
fluence members of the U.S. Congress or State and local
legislatures, their staffs or the staffs of committees
of these bodies to favor or oppose pending, proposed,
or existing legislation, appropriations, or other offi-
cial actions of these bodies, their members, or their
committees, or to engage in any campaign to directly
encourage others to do so.
8. 20 January 1983 Proposed Revision to PAR, FPR, and 0MB
Circular A-122
(a) Attempting to influence the outcome of any Federal,
State, or local election, referendum, initiative,
or similar procedure, through contributions, endorse-
ments, publicity or similar activity
(b) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or
paying the expenses of a political action committee,
either directly or indirectly
(c) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through
an attempt to affect the opinions of the general pub-
lic or any segment thereof
(d) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through
communication with any member or employee of a legis-
lative body, or with any governmental official or em-
ployee who may participate in the decisionmaking process
(e) Participating in or contributing to the expenses of
litigation other than litigation in which the organi-
zation is a party with standing to sue or defend on
its own behalf
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(f) Contributing money, services, or any other thing of
value, as dues or otherwise, to an organization that
has political advocacy as a substantial organization-
al purpose, or that spends $100,000 or more per year
on activities constituting political advocacy
9. 4 November 1983 Proposed Revision to 0MB Circular A-122
(a) Attempts to influence the outcome of any Federal,
State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or
similar procedure, through in kind or cash contribu-
tions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity
(b) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or pay-
ing the expenses of a political party, campaign, pol-
itical action committee, or other organization
established for the purpose of influencing the out-
comes of elections
(c) Attempts to influence legislation pending before Con-
gress or a State legislature by communicating with
any member or employee of the Congress or legislature
(including efforts to influence state or local offi-
cials to engage in similar lobbying activity) , or
with any government official or employee in connection
with a decision to sign or veto enacted legislation
(d) Preparation, distribution, or use of publicity or
propaganda designed to influence legislation pending
before Congress or a State legislature by urging mem-
bers of the general public or any segment thereof to
contribute to or participate in any mass demonstration,
march, rally, or fundraising drive, lobbying campaign,
or letter-writing or telephone campaign, for the pur-
pose of influencing such legislation
(e) Legislative liaison activities, including attendance
at legislative sessions or committee hearings, gather-
ing information regarding pending legislation, and
'analyzing the effect of pending legislation, except
to the extent that such activities do not relate to
lobbying or related activities as defined in paragraph
1 .b. hereof
10. 27 April 1984 Proposed Revision to FAR and 0MB Circular A-122
(a) Attempts to influence the outcomes of any Federal, State,
or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar
procedure, through in kind or cash contributions, en-
dorsements, publicity, or similar activities
(b) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or pay-
ing the expenses of a political party, campaign, poli-
tical action committee, or other organization established
for the purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections
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(c) Any attempt to influence the introduction of Federal
or state legislation; or the enactment or modifica-
tion of any pending Federal or state legislation
through communication with any member or employee
of the Congress or state legislature (including efforts
to influence State or local officials to engage in sim-
ilar lobbying activity) , or with any government offi-
cial or employee in connection with a decision to sign
or veto enrolled legislation
(d) Any attempt to influence the introduction of Federal
or state legislation; or the enactment or modifica-
tion of any pending Federal or state legislation by
preparing, distributing or using publicity or propa-
ganda, or by urging members of the general public or
any segment thereof to contribute to or participate
in any mass demonstration, march, rally, fundraising
drive, lobbying campaign or letter writing or tele-
phone campaign
(e) Legislative liaison activities, including attendance
at legislative sessions or committee hearings, gather-
ing information regarding legislation, and analyzing
the effect of legislation, when such activities are
carried on in support of or in knowing preparation
for an effort to engage in unallowable lobbying.
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APPENDIX F
DECEMBER 19 77 PROPOSED CHANGE TO ASPR
PROPOSED NEW ASPR 15-205.51
15-205.51 Lobbying Costs (CWAS-NA)
.
(a) Lobbying is defined as any activity or communica-
tion which is intended or designed to directly influence
Members of Congress, their staffs or committee staffs to favor
or oppose pending, proposed or existing federal legislation
or appropriations. Lobbying includes but is not limited to
personal discussions or conferences, advertising, sending tel-
egrams, engaging in telephonic communications, and letters.
(b) The costs of lobbying, including the applicable por-
tion of the salaries and fees of those individuals engaged
in lobbying efforts in behalf of a contractor, regardless of
whether or not the individuals are registered as lobbyists
under any applicable law, are unallowable. In addition, the
directly associated costs (see 15-205.6) of lobbying are
unallowable
.
(c) The definition of lobbying does not include legis-
lation liaison activities such as attendance at committee
hearings, appearances before committee hearings at the re-
quest of the committee, and gathering information regarding
pending legislation, provided, however, that the attendance
or effort of those individuals involved are not part of a
lobbying plan or campaign. In order for the costs of such
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liaison activity to be allowable, however, the contractor must
submit documentation sufficient to establish clearly the na-
ture and purpose of the activity to which the costs relate
and which demonstrates that none of the claimed costs consti-
tute directly associated costs of unclaimed lobbying costs.
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APPENDIX G
NOVEMBER 1979 PROPOSED CHANGE TO DAR
PROPOSED NEW PAR 15-20 5.51
[15-205.51 Lobbying Costs (CWAS-NA)
(a) Lobbying is defined as any activity the purpose of
which is to affect any legislation or other official actions
of the U.S. Congress, its members and employees, either direct-
ly through employment of a third party or by encouraging its
officers or employees to do so. Except as provided in (c)
below, such activities include but are not necessarily limi-
ted to appearances before Congressional committees or sub-
committees, all forms of written or oral communications, such
as face-to-face discussions or conferences, telephonic conver-
sations, advertisements, and the sending of telegrams or letters
(b) The costs of lobbying, including the applicable por-
tion of the salaries and fees of those individuals engaged
in lobbying efforts on behalf of a contractor, whether or not
the individuals are registered as lobbyists under any appli-
cable law, are unallowable.
(c) Legislative liaison activities such as attendance
at committee hearings, and gathering information regarding
pending legislation are not lobbying and are allowable. In
addition, written or oral communications, appearances before
Congressional committees and subcommittees, and meetings with
Congressional representatives are allowable legislative liaison
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activities when such efforts are undertaken after receipt of
an invitation or request from a Congressional source and the
invitation or request is documented. The contractor shall
maintain and make available to the Government, records and
documentation sufficient to establish the nature and purpose
of those activities claimed as legislative liaison.]
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APPENDIX H
OCTOBER 1981 CHANGE TO DAR 15.205-51
ADD the following to DAR Section XV Part 2:
15-05.51 Lobbying Costs
(a) For the purpose of this section lobbying is defined
as [any activity or communication which is intended or designed
to directly influence or to engage in any campaign to encour-
age others to influence members of the Congress, their staffs,
or the staffs of committees of the Congress to favor or oppose
legislation, appropriations or other actions of the Congress,
its members, or its committees, for the procurement of spe-
cific supplies or services by the federal government.] Except
as provided in (c) below, lobbying activity includes, but is
not limited to, all forms of communications by the contractor,
its employees, or its agents with the Congress, its members,
and staffs of members and committees for the above-mentioned
purpose.
(b) The costs of lobbying as defined herein, including
the applicable portion of the salaries of the contractor's
employees and the fees of individuals or firms engaged in
lobbying, on behalf of the contractor (whether or not the in-
dividuals or firms are registered as lobbyists under any ap-
plicable law) are unallowable. In addition, the directly
associated costs (see 15-201.6) of lobbying are unallowable.
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(c) Legislative liaison activities, such as attendance
at committee hearings, gathering information regarding pend-
ing legislation, analysis of the effect of pending legislation,
and the like are not lobbying and are allowable. In addition,
communications that would be considered lobbying in accor-
dance with (a) above shall be allowable if they are performed
after receipt of an invitation or request from a congressional
or executive branch source.
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APPENDIX I
NOVEMBER 1982 CHANGE TO DAR 15.205-51
15-205.51 Lobbying Costs. (CWAS-NA)
(a) For the purpose of this section, lobbying is defined
as any activity, including legislative liaison, or communica-
tion which is intended or designed to influence, directly or
indirectly, or to engage in any campaign to encourage others
to influence members of any legislative body, their staffs,
or the staffs of their committees to favor or oppose legis-
lation, appropriations or other actions of the legislative
body, its members, or its committees. Lobbying activity in-
cludes, but is not limited to, all forms of communications
for the above-mentioned purposes by the contractor, its em-
ployees, or its agents with the legislative body, its members,
and staffs of members and committees.
(b) The costs of lobbying as defined herein, including
the applicable portion of the salaries of the contractor's
employees and the fees of individuals or firms engaged in lob-
bying, on behalf of the contractor (whether or not the indi-
viduals or firms are registered as lobbyists under any
applicable law) are unallowable. In addition, the directly
associated costs (see 15-201.6) of lobbying are unallowable.
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APPENDIX J
NOVEMBER 1982 CHANGE TO FPR 1-15.205-52
§1-15.205-52 Lobbying costs.
(a) For purposes of this section, lobbying is defined
as any activity or communication that is intended or designed
(1) to directly influence members of the U.S. Congress or
State and local legislatures, their staffs or the staffs of
committees of these bodies to favor or oppose pending, pro-
posed, or existing legislation, appropriations, or other offi-
cial actions of these bodies, their members, or their committees,
or (2) to engage in any campaign to directly encourage others
to do so. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this sec-
tion, lobbying includes, but is not limited to, appearances
before any legislative committee or subcommittee and written
or oral communications, including face-to-face discussions
or conferences, telephone conversations, paid advertisements
and the sending of telegrams or letters.
(b) The costs of lobbying, including the applicable por-
tion of the salaries and fees of those individuals engaged
in lobbying efforts on behalf of a contractor, whether or not
the individuals are registered as lobbyists under any appli-
cable law, are unallowable.
(c) Legislative liaison activities, such as attendance
at committee hearings and gathering information regarding
pending legislation, are not lobbying and are allowable. In
112
addition, written or oral communications, appearances before
legislative committees and subcommittees, and meetings with
legislative representatives are allowable legislative liaison
activities when such efforts are undertaken in conjunction
with a legislative public hearing or meeting in response to
a public notice, or a specific invitation or request from a
legislative source, and the notice, invitation, or request
is documented, the contractor shall maintain and make avail-
able to the Government, records and documentation sufficient
to identify the costs and clearly establish the nature and





JANUARY 1983 PROPOSED CHANGE TO 0MB CIRCULAR A-122,
DAR 15.205-51, AND FPR 1-15.205-52
Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-122
Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations
Circular A-122 is revised by modifying Attachment B as follows:
1. Insert a new paragraph "B 33 Political Advocacy ."
a. The cost of activities constituting political advo-
cacy are unallowable.
b. Political advocacy is any activity that includes:
(1) Attempting to influence the outcome of any Fed-
eral, State, or local election, referendum, ini-
tiative, or similar procedure, through contributions,
endorsements, publicity, or similar activity;
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or
paying the expenses of a political action commit-
tee, either directly or indirectly;
(3) Attempting to influence governmental decisions
through an attempt to affect the opinions of the
general public or any segment thereof;
(4) Attempting to influence governmental decisions
through communication with any member or employee
of a legislative body, or with any government
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official or employee who may participate in the
decisionmaking process;
(5) Participating in or contributing to the expenses
of litigation other than litigation in which the
organization is a party with standing to sue or
defend on its own behalf; or
(6) Contributing money, services, or any other thing
of value, as dues or otherwise, to an organization
that has political advocacy as a substantial or-
ganizational purpose, or that spends $100,000 or
more per year on activities constituting politi-
cal advocacy.
c. Political advocacy does not include the following
activities:
(1) Making available the results of nonpartisan anal-
ysis, study, or research, the distribution of which
is not primarily designed to influence the outcome
of any Federal, State, or local election,' referen-
dum, initiative, or similar procedure, or any
governmental decision;
(2) Providing technical advice or assistance to a gov-
ernmental body or to a committee or other subdivi-
sion thereof in response to a written request by
such body or subdivision;
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(3) Participating in litigation on behalf of other
persons, if the organization has received a Fed-
eral, State, or local grant, contract, or other
agreement for the express purpose of doing so;
(4) Applying or making a bid in connection with a
grant, contract, unsolicited proposal, or other
agreement, or providing information in connection
with such application at the request of the gov-
ernment agency awarding the grant, contract, or
other agreement; or
(5) Engaging in activities specifically required by
law.
d. An organization has political advocacy as a "sub-
stantial organizational purpose" if:
(1) The organization's solicitations for membership
or contributions acknowledge that the organiza-
tion engages in activities constituting politi-
cal advocacy; or
(2) Twenty percent (20%) or more of the organization's
annual expenditures, other than those incurred
in connection with Federal, State or local grants,
contracts, or other agreements, are incurred in
connection with political advocacy.
e. The term, "governmental decisions" includes:
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(1) The introduction, passage amendment, defeat, sign-
ing, or veto of legislation, appropriations, reso-
lutions, or constitutional amendments at the Federal,
State, or local level;
(2) Any rulemakings, guidelines, policy statements
or other administrative decisions of general appli-
cability and future effect; or
(3) Any licensing, grant, ratemaking, formal adjudica-
tion or informal adjudication, other than actions
or decisions related to the administration of the
specific grant, contract, or agreement involved.
f. Notwithstanding the provisions of other cost princi-
ples in this circular:
(1) Salary costs of individuals are unallowable if:
(a) the work of such individuals includes acti-
vities constituting political advocacy, other
than activities that are both ministerial
and non-material; or
(b) the organization has required or induced such
individuals to join or pay dues to an organi-
zation, other than a labor union, that has
political advocacy as a substantial organiza-
tional purpose, or to engage in political
advocacy during non-working hours.
(2)- The following 'costs are unallowable:
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(a) building or office space in which more than
5% of the usable space occupied by the or-
ganization or an affiliated organization is
devoted to activities constituting political
advocacy;
(b) items of equipment or other items used in
part for political advocacy;
(c) meetings and conferences devoted in any part
to political advocacy;
(d) publication and printing allocable in part
to political advocacy; and
(e) membership in an organization that has poli-
tical advocacy as a substantial organizational
purpose, or that spends $100,000 or more per




NOVEMBER 198 3 PROPOSED CHANGE TO 0MB CIRCULAR A- 122
Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-122
Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations
Circular A-122 is revised as follows:
1. Insert a new paragraph in Attachment B, as follows: "B21
Lobbying and Related Activities .
a. (1) Organizations shall include, as part of their
annual indirect cost proposal, a statement identify-
ing by category costs attributable in whole or in
part to activities made unallowable by subparagraph
b, and stating hown they are accounted for.
(2) The certification required as a part of the
Financial Status Report required under Attachment G
of Circular A-110 shall be deemed to be a certifica-
tion that the requirements and standards of this par-
agraph, and of other paragraphs of Circular A-122
respecting "lobbying and related activities," have
been complied with.
(3) Organizations shall maintain adequate records
to demonstrate that the determination of costs as
being allowable or unallowable pursuant to subpara-
graph a(l) above complies with the requirements of
this Circular.
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(4) For the purposes of complying with subparagraph
a, there will be no requirement for time logs, calen-
dars, or similar records documenting the activities
of an employee whose salary is treated as an indirect
cost, and the absence of time logs or comparable re-
cords for indirect cost employees not kept pursuant
to the discretion of the grantee or contractor will
not serve as a basis for contesting or disallowing
claims, unless: (a) the employee engages in lobbying
or related activities more than 25% of the time or
(b) the organization has materially misstated allow-
able or unallowable costs within the preceding five
year period. Agency guidance regarding the extent
and nature of documentation required pursuant to sub-
paragraph a (3) shall be reviewed under the criteria
of the Paperwork Reduction Act, to ensure that re-
quirements are the least burdensome necessary to satis-
fy the objectives of this subparagraph.
(5) Agencies shall establish procedures for resolving
in advance, in consultation with 0MB, any significant
questions or disagreements concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of subparagraphs a or b. Any such
advance resolution, if in writing, shall be binding
in any subsequent settlements, audits, or investiga-
tions with respect to that grant or contract for pur-
poses of interpretation of this Circular.
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b. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Circular,
costs associated with the following activities are unallowable:
(1) Attempts to influence the outcomes of any Feder-
al, State, or local election, referendum, initiative,
or similar procedure, through in kind or cash contri-
butions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity;
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to,
or paying the expenses of a political party, campaign,
political action committee, or other organization
established for the purpose of influencing the out-
comes of elections;
(3) Attempts to influence legislation pending before
Congress or a State legislature by communicating with
any member or employee of the Congress or legislature,
(including efforts to influence state or local offi-
cials to engage in similar lobbying activity) , or with
any government official or employee in connection with
a decision to sign or veto enacted legislation;
(4) Preparation, distribution, or use of publicity
or propaganda designed to influence legislation pend-
ing before Congress or a State legislature by urging
members of the general public or any segment thereof
to contribute to or participate in any mass demonstra-
tion, march, rally, or fundraising drive, lobbying
campaign, or letter-writing or telephone campaign,
for the purpose of influencing such legislation; or
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(5) Legislative liaison activities, including atten-
dance at legislative sessions or committee hearings,
gathering information regarding pending legislation,
and analyzing the effect of pending legislation, ex-
cept to the extent that such activities do not relate
to lobbying or related activities as defined by para-
graph l.b. hereof.
c. Notwithstanding subparagraph b, costs associated with
the following activities are not unallowable under
this paragraph:
(1) Providing technical advice or assistance to the
Congress or a State legislature or to a member, com-
mittee, or other subdivision thereof, in response to
a specific written request by such member, legisla-
tive body, or subdivision;
(2) Any communication with an executive branch offi-
cial or employee, other than a communication made ex-
pressly unallowable by paragraph l.b. (3) hereof.
(3) Any activity in connection with an employer's
service as an elected or appointed official or member
of a governmental advisory panel;
(4) Any lobbying or related activity at the state
level for the purpose of influencing legislation
directly affecting the ability of the organization
or cost to the organization of performing the grant.
122
contract, or other agreement; however, state govern-
ments acting as subgrantors may, through appropriate
state processes, waive the current practice under 0MB
Circular A-102 making Circular A-I22 applicable to
nonprofit subgrantees with regard to such lobbying
activities at the state level as are deemed appropriate
(5) Any activity specifically authorized by statute
to be undertaken pursuant to the federal grant, con-
tract, or other agreement.
2. Renumber subsequent paragraphs of Attachment B
3. Insert language in subparagraph B.4.b of Attachment A,
so that it reads as follows:
b. Promotion, lobbying or related activities (as defined
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(a) (1) Contractors shall include, as part of their annual
indirect cost proposals, a statement identifying by category
costs attributable in whole or in part to activities made un-
allowable by subparagraph (b) , and stating how they are account-
ed for.
(2) Contractors shall submit as a part of their annual
indirect cost proposal a certification that the requirements
and standards of this section respecting "lobbying and related
activities," have been complied with.
(3) Contractors shall maintain adequate records to assure
that the determination of costs as being allowable and unallow-
able costs pursuant to subparagraph (a) (1) above complies with
the requirements of this section.
(4) For the purposes of complying with paragraph (a) , of
this section there will be no requirement for time logs, cal-
endars, or similar records, documenting the activities of an em-
ployee whose salary is treated as an indirect cost, and the
absence of time logs or comparable records for indirect cost
employees not kept pursuant to the discretion of the grantee
or contractor will not serve as a basis for contesting or dis-
allowing claims, unless: (a) The employee engages in lobbying
or related activities more than 25% of the time or (b) the
organization has materially misstated allowable or unallowable
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costs within the preceding five year period. Agency guidance
regarding the extent and the nature of documentation required
pursuant to subparagraph (a) (3) shall be reviewed under the
criteria of the Paperwork Reduction Act, to ensure that re-
quirements are the least burdensome necessary to satisfy the
objectives of this subparagraph.
(5) Contracting officers shall enter into advance agree-
ment where necessary to resolve any significant questions or
disagreements concerning the interpretation or application
of subparagraphs (a) or (b) . Any such advance agreement shall
be binding in any subsequent settlements, audits, or investi-
gations with respect to that contract for purposes of inter-
pretation of this section.
(b) Cost associated with the following activities are
unallowable:
(1) Attempts to influence the outcome of any Federal, State,
or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar proce-
dure, through in kind or cash contributions, endorsements,
publicity, or similar activity.
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or paying
the expenses of a political action committee, or other organi-
zation established for the purpose of influencing the outcomes
of elections.
(3) Attempts to influence legislation pending before Con-
gress, State or local legislature by communicating with any
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member or employee of the Congress or legislature (including
efforts to influence state or local officials to engage in
similar lobbying activity) , or with any government official
or employee in connection with a decision to sign or veto en-
acted legislation.
(4) Preparation, distribution, or use of publicity or pro-
paganda designed to influence legislation pending before Con-
gress, State or local legislature, by urging members of the
general public or any segment thereof to contribute to or par-
ticipate in any mass demonstration, march, rally, or fund
raising drive, lobbying campaign, or letter-writing or tele-
phone compaign, for the purpose of influencing such legisla-
tion or regulation.
(5) Legislative liaison activities.
(c) Costs associated with the following activities are
not unallowable under this paragraph:
(1) Any communication with an executive branch official
or employee, other than a communication made expressly unallow-
able by paragraph (b) (3) hereof.
(2) Any activity in connection with an employee's service
as an elected or appointed official or member of a governmen-
tal advisory panel.
(3) Any activity specifically authorized by statute to
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SUBPART 1-15.2 CONTRACTS WITH COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
3. Section 1-15.205-52 is revised to read as follows:
§ 1-15.205-52 Lobbying and related activities.
(a) (1) Contractors shall include, as part of their annual
indirect cost proposal, a statement identifying by category
costs attributable in whole or in part to activities made un-
allowable by paragraph (b) of this section, and stating how
they are accounted for.
(2) Contractors shall submit as a part of their annual in-
direct cost proposal a certification that the requirements
and standards of this § 1-15.205-52 have been complied with.
(3) Contractors shall maintain adequate records to assure
that the determination of costs as being allowable and un-
allowable costs pursuant to paragraph (a) (1) above complies
with the requirements of this section.
(4) For the purposes of complying with paragraph (a) of
this section, there is no requirement for time logs, calen-
dars, or similar records documenting the activities of an em-
ployee whose salary is treated as an indirect cost, and the
absence of time logs or comparable records for indirect cost
employees not kept pursuant to the discretion of the contrac-
tor will not serve as a basis for contesting or disallowing
claims, unless; (i) the employee engages in lobbying or related
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activities more than 25% of the time, or (ii) the organiza-
tion has materially misstated allowable or unallowable costs
within the preceding five year period. Agency guidance re-
garding the extent and nature of documentaion required pur-
suant to paragraph (a) (3) of this section shall be reviewed
under the criteria of the Paperwork Reduction Act, to ensure
that requirements are the least burdensome necessary to satis-
fy the objectives of this paragraph.
(5) Contracting officers shall enter into advance agree-
ment where necessary to resolve any significant questions or
disagreements concerning the interpretation or application
of paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section. Any such advance
agreement shall be binding in any subsequent settlements, au-
dits, or investigations with respect to contracts for purposes
of interpretation of this section.
(b) Costs associated with the following activities are
unallowable
:
(1) Attempts to influence the outcome of any Fedetal, State,
or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar proce-
dure, through in kind or cash contributions, endorsements,
publicity, or similar activity.
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or paying
the expenses of a political party, campaign, political action
committee, or other organization established for the purpose
of influencing the outcomes of elections.
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(3) Attempts to influence legislation pending before Con-
gress or a State legislature by communicating with any mem-
ber or employee of the Congress or legislature, (including
efforts to influence State or local officials to engage in
similar lobbying activity) , or with any government official
or employee in connection with a decision to sign or veto
enacted legislation.
(4) Preparation, distribution, or use of publicity or pro-
paganda designed to influence legislation pending before Con-
gress or a State legislature by urging members of the general
public or any segment thereof to contribute to or participate
in any mass demonstration, march, rally, or fundraising drive,
lobbying campaign, or letter-writing or telephone campaign,
for the purpose of influencing such legislation.
(5) Legislative liaison activities, including attendance
at legislative sessions or committee hearings, gathering in-
formation regarding pending legislation, and analyzing the
effect of pending legislation, except to the extent that such
activities do not relate to lobbying or related activities
defined by paragraph (b) hereof.
(c) Costs associated with the following activities are not
unallowable under this § 1-15.205-52:
(1) Providing technical advice or assistance to the Con-
gress or a State legislature or to a member, committee, or
other subdivision' thereof , in response to a specific written
request by such member, legislative body, or subdivision.
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(2) Any communication with an executive branch official
or employee, other than a communication made expressly un-
allowable by paragraph (b) (3) of this section.
(3) Any activity in connection with an employee's service
as an elected or appointed official or member of a governmen-
tal advisory panel.
(4) Any lobbying or related activity at the state level
for the purpose of influencing legislation directly affecting
the ability of the organization or cost to the organization
of performing the contract.
(5) Any activity specifically authorized by statute to be
undertaken pursuant to the contract.
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